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I. ASSASSINATIONS

AND LICIT TARGETED KILLINGS-DISTINCTIONS
WITH A DIFFERENCE?

The Oxford Dictionary Online defines Assassin as "a murderer of an
important person in a surprise attack for political or religious reasons."]
Due to the complexity of "surprise attack for political .. . reasons," such
killings cannot occur without legal implication, political repercussion,
operational complexity, 2 or the absence of historical context. This begs
the question: what exactly constitutes "targeted killing," as compared or
opposed to, an "assassination"? The answer to this question is far from
settled, largely because there is profound disagreement about which
body of law should be used to evaluate licit targeted killings, as
distinguished from illegal assassinations. The renowned international
law of war expert Professor Gary Solis terms "targeted killing" to be
1. Assassin Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/americanenglish/assassin?q=Assassin (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
2. Glenn W. Johnson, Mortus Discriminatus: Procedures in Targeted Killing, v, (June
2007) (M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA469936. Johnson's Abstract noted that as of 2007, at least in the
unclassified realm "no widely established standard or published set of guidelines and planning
considerations exist for operational planners to conduct targeted killing operations. Due to the
political complexity intertwined with targeted killing these types of operations rarely occur
without repercussion. Operational planners need to understand that targeted killing operations
cannot exist solely at the operational level because their consequences have strategic and
political ramifications. By utilizing a case study analysis, this thesis will identify the operational
planning considerations that need to be addressed to successfully conduct a targeted killing
mission."
3. Id. at 23-41. Johnson examines in a non-exclusive, non-chronological order, the
successful and unsuccessful efforts at targeted killings of: A. Ahmed Jibril (founder and leader
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-1980s through present-unsuccessful),
Pablo Escobar (Columbian druglord-July 2, 1994-successful); Palestinian terrorists (in
Israel's Operation Wrath of God-also known as Operation Bayonet-vengeance killings of
terrorists involved in 1972 massacre of Israeli Olympians-1972-successful);
Obergruppenfithrer Reinhard Heydrich (chaired the 1942 Wannsee Conference, which
discussed plans for the deportation and extermination of all Jews in German-occupied
territory-attempt made as Operation Anthropoid-October 28, 1941-ultimately successful);
Hamas Terrorists (various dates-varying success); and, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (Japanese
Naval Marshal General and the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet during World War
II-April 18, 1943-successful).
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"the targeting and killing, by a government or its agents, of a civilian or
'unlawful combatant' taking a direct part in hostilities in the context of
an armed conflict who is not in that government's custody and cannot
be reasonably apprehended." 4
Former Special Ambassador for Counterterrorism Dell Dailey, has
said "targeted killing," as understood by select members of Special
Operations Forces (Operators), is "the employment of a weapons
platform designed for both sensing and destroying an identified enemy
target with the maximum use of current technology while retaining a
human in the decision making process."
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions Philip Alston has said, "a targeted killing is the intentional,
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents
acting under color [sic] of law, or by an organized armed group in
armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical
custody of the perpetrator." 6
In contemporary times, U.S. presidents have prescribed or
proscribed various forms of targeted killings, and related to such
prescriptions and proscriptions, delegated limited presidential
functions. 7 Relevant to this Article, was the December 4, 1981
Executive Order 12333, issued by President Ronald Reagan, "United
States Intelligence Activities."8 Section 2.11 of the order provides the
following: "Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or
conspire to engage in, assassination." 9 Section 2.12 of Executive Order
4.

GARY D. SoLs, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

INWAR 538 (2010).
5.

CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN ET AL., TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND

MORALITY IN AN

ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 358 (2012). Among his many military and diplomatic assignments,

Dailey directed the new Center for Special Operations, the military hub for all counterterrorism,
before retiring to control of the State Department's counterterrorism office, from which he
"promoted interagency collaboration and built closer partnerships between military personnel
and the members of other U.S. government departments and agencies involved in global
counterterrorism activities. Biography of Dell L. Dailey, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/outofdate/bios/87639.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
6. Philip Alston, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, at 4 (May 28, 2010), available at
http://www.extrajudicialexecutions.org/application/media/14%2OHRC/20Targeted%2OKillings%20R
eport%20%28A.HRC. 14.24.Add6%29.pdf.
7. Regarding presidential delegation of authority, consider generally that Article II,
section 1 of the Constitution reads, in part, "[t]he executive power shall be vested in a president
of the United States of America." Article II, section 3 asserts that, "[t]he President shall take
care that the laws befaithfully executed. . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
8. Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
9. Id. Executive Order 12333 was the last of three executive orders banning
assassination. See generally ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
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12333 forbids indirect participation in activities prohibited by the order,
stating: "Indirect participation. No agency of the Intelligence
Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake
activities forbidden by this Order."' 0 While Executive Order 12333 is
still in force, post September 11, 2001 legislation has "opened the door"
to a reinterpretation of the assassination ban, if not repealing it entirely.
On Friday, September 14, 2001, both the House and the Senate passed
joint resolutions authorizing the President to:
Use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. 11
Published reports in popular media' 2 as well as governmental

ASSASSINATION BAN AND E.O. 12333: A BRIEF SUMMARY

(Jan. 4, 2002), available at

http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21037.pdf. Bazan noted that the first order was issued by President
Ford in response to concerns raised in the 19 70s with respect to alleged abuses by the U.S.
intelligence community. Exec. Order No. 11905, § 5(g), 41 Fed. Reg. 7703, 7738 (Feb. 19,
1976). This section of the Executive Order 11905 stated, "Prohibition of Assassination. No
employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political
assassination." Id. This is commonly viewed as a condemnation of assassination and rejection of
it as an instrument of American policy. BAzAN, Supra, at 1-2. Bazan also noted that "the
assassination ban in E.O. 11905 was superseded by Executive Order 12036, Sec. 2-305
(assassination prohibition) and Sec. 2-309 (indirect participation prohibition), 3, 43 Fed. Reg.
3674, 3688, 3689 (President Jimmy Carter, 1/26/78). The pertinent provisions in President
Reagan's E.O. 12333, in turn, superseded those in President Carter's order." Id. at 2.
10. Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981); S.J. Res. 23, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 64, 107th Cong. (2001).
11. The Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 23, before 11:00 a.m. on Friday,
September 14, 2001. The House passed it late Friday evening, September 14, 2001. The
President signed it into law on Tuesday, September 18, 2001. Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 2224 (2001). For a detailed discussion of authorizations of
the use of U.S. military force, see JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV.,

RL 31133, DECLARATIONS

OF WAR AND

AUTHORIZATIONS OF USE OF

MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (2007), available at

http://www. fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf.
12. Siobhan Gorman, CIA Had Secret Al Qaeda Plan, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2009),
availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124736381913627661.html#mod=djemalertNEWS.
See also Marc Ambinder, What Was that Secret CIA Operation? Targeted Assassinations?,
ATLANTIC (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/07/
what-was-that-secret-cia-operation-targeted-assassinations/21144/.
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sources 1 3 have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
the Pentagon has expanded its counterterrorism intelligence activities,
counterterrorist operations, and as a subset of the latter, targeted
killings, while Congress has maintained legal authority for oversight of
such activities. In Sections 601-604 of the 1991 Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference, significant provisions were
set forth regarding congressional oversight of intelligence activities,
including requirements relating to the authorization of covert actions by
the President and the reporting of covert actions to Congress. These
provisions imposed the following requirements:
A finding that determines such an action is necessary to support
identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is
important to the national security of the United States must be in
writing.
A finding may not retroactively authorize covert activities which
have already occurred. The President must determine that the
covert action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy
objectives of the United States.
A finding must specify all government agencies involved and
whether any third party will be involved.
A finding may not authorize any action intended to influence
United States political processes, public opinion, policies or
media.
A finding may not authorize any action which violates the
Constitution of the United States or any statutes of the United
States.
Notification to the congressional leaders specified in the bill must
be followed by submission of the written finding to the chairmen
of the intelligence committees.
The intelligence committees must be informed of significant
changes in covert actions.
No funds may be spent by any department, agency or entity of
the Executive Branch on a covert action until there has been a
13.

ALFRED CUMMING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33715, COVERT ACTION: LEGISLATIVE

BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE POLICY QUESTIONS (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

intel/RL33715.pdf.
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signed, written finding.14
Two major camps are emerging which have competing views about
the choice of law that should govern targeted killings in the
international arena. First, there is international human ri hts law (IHR),
which argues a more restricted view of targeted killings. Second, there
is international humanitarian law (IHL), which argues for a broader
view of targeted killings.16 Targeted killings are largely viewed as
illegal from the framework of IHR because this view gives a
presumption of innocence that would be violated by a targeted killing
from, say, a Predator drone attack. Instead the objects of targeted
killings, under such a theory, "should be arrested, detained, and
interrogated with due process of law; and force should be employed
only if necessary. There are no other measures available and is not of a
lethal nature if a lesser degree of force can be effective."597
14. Id. at 5-6 (citing § 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, codified at 50 U.S.C. §
413b).
15. W. Jason Fisher, Targeted Killing, Norms, and InternationalLaw, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 719 (2007).
16. Id. at 719; InternationalHuman Rights Law, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/Pages/

IntemationalLaw.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (noting that "[i]nternational human rights law
lays down obligations which States are bound to respect"). According to the High
Commissioner for Human Rights,
[a] series of international human rights treaties and other instruments adopted
since 1945 have conferred legal form on inherent human rights and developed
the body of international human rights. Other instruments have been adopted at
the regional level reflecting the particular human rights concerns of the region
and providing for specific mechanisms of protection, [and that w]hile
international treaties and customary law form the backbone of international
human rights law other instruments, such as declarations, guidelines and
principles adopted at the international level contribute to its understanding,
implementation and development. Respect for human rights requires the
establishment of the rule of law at the national and international levels.
Id.
17. Fisher, supra note 15, at 719. For what comprises IHL, see What is International
HumanitarianLaw?, ADVISORY SERVICE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ICRC (July
2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what is_ihl.pdf. According to the International
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC),
International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian
reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or
are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods
of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or
the law of armed conflict.
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H1.

"GUNS FOR HIRE": THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS
AND PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS AS DISTINCT ENTITIES AND
NOT JUST MERCENARIES BY ANOTHER NAME

This Article could not do justice to chronicling the complete history
of private military firms (PMFs) or private military corporations
(PMCs); instead the reader should consider, amongst many excellent
works on the subject, Peter Singer's masterwork, Corporate Warriors,
as an encyclopedic examination of present-day PMFs and PMCs. Also
beyond the scope of this commentary lies the scourge of extrajudicial,
illicit killings committed by criminals categorized as maritime pirates,
sea robbers, skyjackers/air pirates, or terrorists. 19 Simply put, PMFs
operate globally, often with strategic impact on both the process and
outcome of commencing, sustaining, and concluding armed conflicts. 20
They have also become integral to the domestic security systems of
many nations around the globe. 2 1 A significant clarification will rate
much commentary to follow: PMF contractors are not mercenaries, 22
Id
18.

PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY

INDUSTRY 8 (2003). Peter Singer is a National Security Fellow at the Brookings Institute.
Biography, PWSINGER.COM, http://www.pwsinger.com/biography.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2013). Singer has been widely published in his critiques against the privatization of warfare.
See, e.g., Kevin H. Govern & Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military Firms:
International Law Misses its Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 55 (2008); LOUISE
DOSWALD-BECK, FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE

MILITARY COMPANIES ch. 7 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007) (private military

companies under international humanitarian law). A variety of terms have been used for such
private military entities. Hereinafter, this chapter will refer to Private Military Firms (PMFs) for
such entities.
19. Kevin H. Govern, National Solutions to an International Scourge: Prosecuting
Piracy Domestically as a Viable Alternative to InternationalTribunals, 19 U. MIAMI INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 1 (2011). This author significantly distinguishes between and among those
categories of illegal actors subject to national and international criminal law, and the laws of
war. As a general rule, pirates and terrorists are presumed subject to criminal law, not the law of
war.
20.

SINGER, supra note 18.

21. Id.
22. Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to Self-Determination, Human
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7,
56 (Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/100/75/PDF/GO810075.pdf?OpenElement. ("[The Working
Group] is of the opinion that many . . . such manifestations are new modalities of mercenaryrelated activities."). See also Alexander Higgins, US Rejects UN Mercenary Report, USA
TODAY (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://usatoday3O.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-173392316 246_x.htm. "[The] U.N. report ... said the use of private security guards like those
involved in the [Nusoor Square] shooting . . . amounted to a new form of mercenary activity."
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

7

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

154

[Vol. 25

and forces other than standing national armies can also legitimately
engage in warfare.23 PMF contractors have a legal distinction that sets
them apart from mercenaries,24 and it is unlikely that any nation could
successfully establish who is a mercenary under current international
law.25 In Singer's estimation hiring of private individuals to fight
battles "is as old as war itself."
Without engaging in an exhaustive exposition on the history of
mercenaries and PMFs, there are several notable instances of such
private forces being engaged to conduct licit targeted killing and illicit
assassination missions. For instance, Ninja were peasant farmers who
learned the art of war to combat the feudal lords' (daimyo's) duly
constituted private military forces (samurai)27 as well as master-less
military forces (ronin).2 8 The Ninja first arose in the fourteenth century,
but were not widely known or used till the fifteenth century and were
hired through the mid-eighteenth century to perform capture, infiltration
and retrieval, and, most infamously, assassinations. A Welshman,
Owain Lawgoch (Owain of the Red Hand), formed a "free company" of
mercenaries and fought for the French against the English during the
Hundred Years War.3o Owain, as a mercenary, lived and died by the
sword and was successfully targeted and killed by the Scotsman Jon
Lamb under the orders of the English Crown in 1378 during the siege of
Mortagne-sur-Mer. 3 1 Modern history is replete with other examples,
which rebut the contemporary notion that war, assassination, and
targeted killing has been conducted exclusively by standing armies of
sovereign nation-states,3 2 and the "monopoly of the state over violence
23. Shawn McCormack, Private Security Contractors in Iraq Violate Laws of War, 31
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 75, 98 (2007) (claiming contractors violate their status as
noncombatants whenever they use force).
24. See generally Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars and Mercenaries: The Casefor CourtsMartial Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 367
(2006); Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War from the
Perspective of Internationaland Human Rights Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 315, 324
(2006) (stating "one of the most fervent and skeptical critics of [PMFs], the former U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique Ballesteros, has implicitly acknowledged that it is
necessary to distinguish [PMFs] and their personnel from actual mercenaries.").
25. See GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 328 n.83 (1980) (Professor Geoffrey Best argues
that any individual who could not exclude himself from the poorly drafted definition(s) of

mercenary deserves to be shot-and his attorney with him!).
26. SINGER, supra note 18, at 19.
27.

ANDREW ADAMS, NINJA: THE INVISIBLE ASSASSINS 46 (1970).

28. Id. at 43.
29. Id. at 84 (for assassination techniques).
30.

GERAINT H. JENKINS, A CONCISE HISTORY OF WALES 110 (2007).

31.
32.

Id.
SINGER, supra note 18, at 18-19.
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is the exception in world history, rather than the rule." 33 This Article's
next part will examine the paradigm shift from nation state military
force to non-state actors in the realm of state security.
By the nineteenth century, strong national armies had diminished the
need and the opportunity for mercenaries, 34 but the diminishing interest
of the superpowers in the security of weaker states created an
opportunity for unemployed soldiers to once again band together and
fill an unmet need for countries unable to provide effectively for their
own security. 35
The end of the Cold War was the catalyst for the growth of modem
mercenarism, and with it the employment of force to conduct support to
"conventional operations" as well as assistance in assassinations and
targeted killings. 36 As the United States and the Soviet Union began
downsizing, the "market" was flooded with soldiers highly skilled in
combat arms. 37 With the thaw in relations with the Soviet Union, the
superpowers were less concerned about maintaining dominating
influence around the globe. The combination of shrinking militaries and
their diminishing commitment to regional security sustained the
mercenary trade by leaving an unfilled security need, particularly in
Africa.
The backers of mercenaries operating in Africa were colonial powers
looking to maintain their influence during decolonization in the 1950s
and 1960s. 38 The most damning link for mercenarism was with
Apartheid, the social and political policy of racial segregation and
discrimination enforced by white minority governments in South Africa
from 1948 to 1994.39 One infamous assassination by a mercenary came
in the April 19, 1993 killing of the African National Congress National
Executive leader Chris Hani by the South African Government-hired
33. Id. at 3 (citing JANICE THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES AND SOVEREIGNS 3 (1994)).
34. See Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and
Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REv. 1 (2003). Todd Milliard's exhaustive
research on the experiences of mercenarism, especially with regard to post-colonial Africa, is
shaping international law on mercenarism.
35. Tina Garmon, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: Holding
Private MilitaryFirms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 325, 326-27 (2003).
36. Ryan Scoville, Toward an Accountability-BasedDefinition of "Mercenary," 37 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 541, 542 (2006).

37. Id.
38. SINGER, supra note 18, at 27, 37.
39. U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to SelfDetermination, Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/49/362
(Sept. 6, 1994), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/9c7293cd5326
3251802566f7005f53ca?Opendocument.
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Polish mercenary Janus Walusz. 40 From this and similar uses,
mercenaries became synonymous with the suppression of selfdetermination movements and international opinion quickly turned
against what had been the long-accepted practice of private actors in
warfare.4 '
Arguably, some "meritorious mercenarism" also took place in
Africa. In 1994, Executive Outcomes was hired by the Angolan
government to prevent its overthrow by the rebel National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).4 2 Executive Outcomes
decimated UNITA, allowing Angola's government to remain in control
and consolidate its power. In 1995, Executive Outcomes did much the
same for Sierra Leone when it dislodged the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) from the diamond fields and forced them to negotiate a
peace settlement with the government. 43 More controversially,
Executive Outcomes purportedly attempted to assassinate the rebel
leader Dr. Jonas Savimbi,4 4 and the Angolan government, under
pressure from the United Nations and the United States, was forced to
terminate the Executive Outcomes' contract. Executive Outcomes was
replaced by the U.N. peacekeeping force known as the U.N. Angola
Verification Mission (UNAVEM). s Angola returned to war shortly
thereafter-with conventional uniformed forces as well as mercenaries
of different affiliations in mutual affray.
Assassination by mercenary was not limited to the African
subcontinent, however; it was reported that the mercenary invasion of
30 French and Belgian mercenaries was led by Bob Denard of the
Comoros from November 26, 1989 through December 15, 1989,
resulting in a coup d 'tat overthrowing and then assassinating President
Ahmed Abdallah Aderemane. 4 6
While mercenaries and other contracted military forces continued to
operate around the world in the ensuing decades, it was not until the
40.

EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1016 (2d ed. 1996).

41.
42.

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 39.
Thomas K. Adams, The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict, 24

PARAMETERS 109 (1999).

43. Id.
44. Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds - Firefight with UNITA, Part One, SOLDIER
FORTUNE MAG. ONLINE (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.sofmag.com/2010/02/executive-outcomes-

against-all-odds-fire fight-with-unita-part-one.
45. Angola - UNA VEM I, U.N. DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO), http://
www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavemi.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). The U.N. Angola
Verification Mission (UNAVEM 1) was established in December 1988 to verify the phased and
total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola. The withdrawal was completed
by May 25, 1991. UNAVEM III terminated its mission June 30, 1997.
46. See John Riley & Michael Gambone, Men with Guns, 28 WiS. INT'L L.J. 39, 73 n.104
(2010).
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events of 9/11, however, that mercenarism experienced its
Renaissance4 7 in the form of a metamorphosis into recent and presentday PMF operations. The Pentagon's U.S. Central Command had by
late 2010 nearly 225,000 contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan
and other areas.4 8 These PMF and PMC operations have ranged from
conducting stationary and convoy security in active combat zones
rather than outright combat operations, to so-called sensitive activities,
under which intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and Special
Operations Forces (SOF) field thousands more under classified
contracts extending into every U.S. military command around the
world.
PMFs took on a significant, albeit classified, role with respect to
supporting and conducting combat operations and targeted killings
shortly after September 11, 2001. President George W. Bush signed a
presidential finding that authorized the CIA to kill Osama bin Laden
and his cohorts.5 The CIA, finding itself short on paramilitary
operators, hired private contractors for work to on drone strikes and
intelligence in Afghanistan, 5 ' despite the claims of the Department of
Defense (DoD) that "[w]e don't have any contracts to do that work for
us. We don't contract that kind of work out." 52 One of the largest and
most conspicuous PMFs currently operating is Blackwater Worldwide
(Blackwater) (currently known as Xe Services, also known as
Academi), founded in 1998 by billionaire Erik Prince; Prince
contradicted the DoD in an interview, telling Vanity Fair that
Blackwater worked with U.S. Special Forces in identifying targets and
47. Eugene B. Smith, The New Condottieriand U.S. Policy: The Privatizationof Conflict
and Its Implications, 32 PARAMETERS 104, 107-08 (2002).
48. Tim Shorrock, America's New Mercenaries, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-12-15/counterinsurgency-outsourcing-am
ericas-new-mercenaries-in-afghanistan-middle-east-africalfull/.
49. See, e.g., ARMY REGULATION (AR) 380-81, SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS (SAPs) AND
SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES (Apr. 21, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar380-

381.pdf. AR 380-81 defines Sensitive activities as "Programs that restrict personnel access,
such as ACC measures; sensitive support to other Federal agencies; clandestine or covert
operational or intelligence activities; sensitive research, development, acquisition, or contracting
activities; special activities; and other activities excluded from normal staff review and oversight
because of restrictions on access to information." Id. at 84.
50.

ROBERT YOUNG PELTON, LICENSED TO KILL: HIRED GUNS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 30

(2006). Osama was the object of a successful targeted killing on April 30, 201 1--Operation
Geronimo. Yassin Musharbash, Al-Qaida Loses Its Leader Osama Bin Laden, Prince of Terror,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (May 2, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,76007
2,00.html.
51.

PELTON, supra note 50, at 30-31.

52. Jeremy Scahill, The Secret US. War in Pakistan, NATION (Dec. 7, 2009),
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091207/scahill.
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planning missions, citing an operation in Syria, 53 and post-2004 targeted
killing operations in which: "[Blackwater] was building a unilateral,
unattributable capability. If it went bad, we weren't ex ecting the chief
of station, the ambassador, or anyone to bail us out." The magazine
also published a photo of a Blackwater outpost near the AfghanistanPakistan border, purportedly used for training Afghan police.5 5 During
the initial stages of the campaign, over half of the 100 CIA paramilitary
operators in Afghanistan were contractors5 6 and contracted security
services from PMFs like Blackwater. 57 The majority of Blackwater's
security operations occurred at the Kabul Airport and the Ariana Hotel,
but a small detachment was stationed at "Fort Apache," the firebase
from which Task Force 11 planned rehearsed, and conducted missions
to conduct direct action missions, 8 notably to neutralize Osama bin
Laden and other senior Taliban and al-Qaeda High Value Targets
(HVTs). 59
Blackwater was once the United States' "go-to contractor in Iraq and
Afghanistan," 60 and trained tens of thousands of security personnel to
work in "hot spots" around the world. 6 1 After media attention
bombarded the company as a result of controversial shootings in Iraq,
Blackwater spawned more than thirty subsidiaries in part to ensure
continuance of millions of dollars in American Government contracts. 62
At least three of those companies secured contracts with the U.S.
military or the CIA, an agency that has awarded up to $600 million in
classified contracts to Blackwater and its subsidiaries throughout the
53. Adam Ciralsky, Tycoon, Contractor,Soldier, Spy, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 2010), available
at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2010/01/blackwater-201001 (last visited Feb. 9,
2013).
54.
55.
56.
CIA).
57.

Id.
Id.
Id. (the other half were CIA employees or Special Forces operators "on loan" to the

58.

Direct Action, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS,

Id.

JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, 108 (Dec. 15, 2012). JP 1-02 defines "direct action" as "Short-duration

strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile,
denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military
capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Also called
DA. See also special operations; special operations forces. (JP 3-05)." Id.
59. Id. Task Force 11 (TF 11) was purportedly the U.S. Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) unit alternatively named TF 626 and TF 145 with its most recently recorded
name being TF 88.
60,

IRAQ FOR SALE: THE WAR PROFITEERS (Brave New Films 2006).

61. Id.
62. James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, 30 FalseFronts Won Contractsfor Blackwater, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at AlA, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middle
east/04blackwater.html.
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past decade.6 3
New York Times reporters, James Risen and Mark Mazzetti,
uncovered credible evidence that Blackwater started receiving CIA
contracts in early 2002 to provide support and security to CIA missions
in Afghanistan, and orders for the contractors to begin collecting
information on the whereabouts of Al Qaeda leaders, carry out
surveillance, and train for possible missions.6 4 During a panel
discussion on the privatization of intelligence and alluding to a
foundational need for contractors to fill needs inherent to successful
targeted killing, planning, and execution, General Michael V. Hayden
said, "[t]here are skills we don't have in government that we may have
an immediate requirement for."65 Quoting one government official
familiar with the CIA program and the role of contractors in targeted
killing, "The actual pulling of a trigger in some ways is the easiest part,
and the part that requires the least e xertise ... It's everything that leads
up to it that's the meat of the issue.'
By 2006, twelve Blackwater "tactical action operatives" were
purportedly recruited for a secret raid into Pakistan, code-named
Vibrant Fury, against a suspected al Qaeda training camp. 67 An offshoot
of Blackwater, "Select PTC" was purportedly involved in classified,
clandestine logistics support and operational activities in countries
around the world, including Jordan, Sweden, Denmark, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and the Philippines,6 8 and the same unit was
63. Id.
64. James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Said to Use Outsiders to PutBombs on Drones,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/us/21intel.html.
65. Id. Hayden ran the CIA from 2006 until early 2009. By way of caveat, the article goes
on to say
General Hayden, who succeeded Mr. Goss at the agency, acknowledged that
the C.I.A. program continued under his watch, though it was not a priority. He
said the program was never prominent during his time at the C.I.A., which was
one reason he did not believe that he had to notify Congress. He said it did not
involve outside contractors by the time he came in.
Id.
66. Id.
67. Same Blackwater, Diferent Names, ABC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2010), http://abcnews.go.
com/Blotter/blackwater-names/story?id=9634372&page=2.
68. Id. See also Michael Biesecker, Company Once Known as Blackwater Settles Arms
Case, AP (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://news.yahoo.com/company-once-known-blackwat
er-settles-arms-case-211509319.html.
The intemational security contractor formerly known as Blackwater agreed to
pay a $7.5 million fine to settle federal criminal charges related to arms
smuggling and other crimes. Documents unsealed August 7, 2012 in a U.S.
District Court in North Carolina said the company, now called Academi LLC,
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also purportedly awarded a classified contract to assassinate al Qaeda
leaders around the world.6 9
An example of such a targeted killing took place in November 2002
in Yemen, when a Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile into the car
carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, a senior al-Qaeda leader. Along with alHarithi, five other men died, including one American who was traveling
with him.70 Blackwater may well have been involved in supporting that
operation; the CIA relied on Blackwater to arm the a ency's Predator
drones that were used for targeted killing operations, "assembl[ing]
and load[ing] Hellfire missiles and laser-guided bombs onto the
pilotless aircraft in secret bases in Afghanistan and neighboring
Pakistan." 72 Although CIA employees maintained control over firing the
drones' weaponry, such collaborative missions demonstrate that the
agency "now depends on outside contractors to perform some of the
agency's most important assignments." 73 These interagency efforts,
however, blur the lines of liability when missions go awry. For
example, former CIA employees revealed that "[i]f a Predator missed a
target, CIA employees would sometimes blame Blackwater employees
agreed to pay the fine as part of a deferred prosecution agreement to settle 17
violations. The list of violations includes possessing automatic weapons in the
United States without registration, lying to federal firearms regulators about
weapons provided to the king of Jordan, passing secret plans for armored
personnel carriers to Sweden and Denmark without U.S. government approval
and illegally shipping body armor overseas.
Id.
69. Biesecker, supra note 68.
70. Walter Pincus, U.S. Missiles Kill Al Qaeda Suspects, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 2002,
available at http://www.theage.com/au/articles/2002/11/05/1036308311314.html. See also
Johnson, supra note 2, at 1. For information on the MQ-1B Predator drone used in this and other
operations, see, e.g., Fact Sheet - MQ-lB Predator, U.S. Air Force, posted Apr. 29, 2013,
http://www.afmillinformation/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fslD=122. The Hellfire II missile is
described by its manufacturer, Lockheed-Martin, as follows:
The HELLFIRE II missile is a combat-proven tactical missile system that can
be launched from multiple air, sea, and ground platforms. Offering multimission, multi-target capability and precision-strike lethality, the HELLFIRE II
missile is the primary 100 lb class air-to-ground precision weapon for the
armed forces of the United States and many other nations.
Press Release, Lockheed Martin, Hellfire II Missile (2013), http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/
products/Hellfirell.html.
71. Alex Sundby, CIA Hired Blackwater to Arm Afghan Drones, CBS NEWS (Aug. 21,
2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5257267-503543.html?tag-cont
entMain;contentBody.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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for the mistake."7 4 Such instances of inaccuracy or oversight threaten
ambiguity for imposing liability and remain fundamental obstacles for
PMC operations.
III. AUTHORITY AND LIABILITY OF CIVILIAN OPERATIVES UNDER
JUST WAR THEORY, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND DOMESTIC LAW

Recently, American presidents and intelligence officials seem to
have adhered to the legal maxim that "[t]he safety of the state is the
supreme law."75 Accordingly, their policy choices lead critics to
question their moral and legal standing at times. Government leaders
and ordinary citizens have long expressed shared concerns for the
"common good"7 6 and for the "common defense."77 In pursuit of these
goals, some American presidents have taken drastic measures that-at
times-stretched the bounds of reason, morality, and the law. Targeted
killing has proven to be such a measure. During the Constitutional
Convention, Federalist critics remarked privately that there was "a
preposterous combination of powers in the President and the Senate,
which may be used improperly." 78 Anti-Federalists forewarned of an
"immediate aristocratic tyranny; that from the difficulty, if not the
impracticability of its operation, must soon terminate in the most
uncontrolled [sic] despotism." 79 These commentators referred to the
vague and far-reaching powers to deal with wars and foreign conflicts
that are accorded to the President and Congress by the U.S.
Constitution. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper Number 70
that the presidency was to be the one part of government that could
respond with "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch [to unforeseen
crises, especially war]."so Today, terrorism poses such grave threats to
74. Id.
75. From the Latin: Salus reipublicae suprema lex. See, e.g., Salus reipublicaesuprema
lex, EU DICTIONARY, http://eudict.com/?lang-lateng&word=salus%20reipublicae%20suprema
%201ex (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
76. See Benjamin Franklin's motto for the Library Company of Philadelphia, 1731, in
Latin: "Communiter Bonaprofundere Deum est. " and in English: "to pour forth benefits for the
common good is divine," available at http://www.librarycompany.org/about/Instance.pdf (last
visited Feb. 27, 2013).
77. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
78.

See THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN VIRGINIA 1787-1788,

at 35 (Worthington

Chauncey Ford 1903).
79.

ELBRIDGE GERRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL

AND STATE CONVENTIONS BY A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT, SIC TRANSIT GLORIA AMERICANA (1788),

available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com-staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1670
&chapter- I 955&layout=html&ltemid=27.
80.

DEAN REUTER & JOHN YOO, CONFRONTING TERROR: 9/11 AND THE FUTURE OF

AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY ESSAYS BY LEADING VOICES IN LAW AND POLICY, ENCOUNTER
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American national security that President Barrack Obama "would rather
kill al Qaeda leaders-whether by drones or Special Ops teams-than
wade through the difficult questions raised by their detention."81
The idea to arm Predator drones for targeted killing missions
reportedly came from Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Director of the bin
Laden unit at the CIA's Counterterrorist Center in the Commonwealth
of Virginia, who wanted to go forward with an armed Predator drone
deployment to Afghanistan in September 2001.82 James Pavitt, Deputy
Director of Operations at CIA since 1999 has long worried
about unintended consequences if the CIA suddenly moved back
into the business of running lethal operations against targeted
individuals-assassination, in the common usage. Such targeted
killings carried out directly by the CIA could open agents in the
field to retaliatory kidnappings or killings. The missions might
also expose the agency to political and media criticism. 83
As it turns out, Pavitt forecasted correctly; years later the media
condemned the CIA for its targeted killing activities. During a
September 4, 2001 Cabinet Meeting, then CIA Director George Tenet
wanted the Bush Administration to understand that
The CIA would be operating a lethal fixed-wing aircraft of the
sort normally controlled by the Air Force and its Pentagon chain
of command. If Bush and his Cabinet wanted to entrust that
operational role to the CIA, Tenet said, they should do so with
their eyes wide open, fully aware of the potential fallout if there
were a controversial or mistaken strike. 84
The Air Force did not want to assume operation of a new technology
that had not been rigorously tested: "Air Force doctrine and experience
argued for the use of fully tested bombers and cruise missiles even
when the targets were lone terrorists. The Air Force was not ready to
begin fielding or commanding armed robots."8 5 This was quite
reasonable, inasmuch as rigorous testing can preempt easily correctable
errors in machine functionality and ensure that if a mission is to be
BOOKS 282 (2011).

8 1. Id. at 288.
82. STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND
BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10TH, 2011, at 580-81 (2004).

83.

Id.

84.

Id. See also DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 345-

46 (2003) (for further discussions on CIA Director Tenet's conversations during the September
4, 2011 Cabinet meetings).
85. COLL, supra note 82, at 581.
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undertaken, that its goals can be achieved within a small margin of
error.
In order to assess the legitimacy of the CIA's carrying out of
targeted killing missions, it becomes necessary to understand the
organization's responsibilities. 86 President Bill Clinton's Presidential
Decision Directives 39 and 62 outlined two major operational antiterrorist mandates for the CIA: (1) rendition and (2) disruption.8 7 Under
these Clinton directives, "foreign terrorists who posed a credible threat
to the United States were subject to preemption and disruption abroad,
consistent with U.S. laws." 8 If justice could not be served against
terrorists at home or abroad, the CIA, as lead on this operation, was to
infiltrate the terrorist enterprise by attacking the factions of al Qaeda
and related groups. 89 These presidential directives were broad enough to
include a vast array of strategic operations and helped to solidify the
CIA as an active player in combating terrorism. 90
Almost by definition, CIA operations are meant to be covert and
unacknowledged. According to Title 50 of the U.S. Code § 413b(e):
Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, covert actions
"[are] intended that the role of the [U.S.] Government will not be
apparent or acknowledged publicly." 9 1 CIA covert operators and
Pentagon Special Operations Forces have come together in U.S. efforts
to combat terrorism. As a result of the combination of these two forces,
the question of who has the power to authorize the use of lethal force
and under what circumstances has become highly debated. 92
The debate over whether Pentagon or CIA operatives should conduct
such operations was going on long before September 11, 2001.93 In June
1948, the National Security Council (NSC) approved NSC 1012 that
"essentially codified the notion of plausible denial . . . operations were

to be 'so planned and executed that any U.S. government responsibility
for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered
the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for
86. See Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Intelligence Policy:
Staff Statement No. 7, 1 [hereinafter Statement No. 7], available at http://www.9-1 Icommiss
ion.gov/staff statements/staff statement7.pdf.
87. See Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counter Terrorism (June 21,
1995), available at http://www.fas.org./irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-39.pdf; see also Fact Sheet,
Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62, Office of the Press Secretary (May
22, 1998), availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm.
88. Statement No. 7, supra note 86, at 3.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2013); see also GREGORY F. TREVERTON, INTELLIGENCE FOR AN
AGE OF TERROR 207 (2009).

92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 228.
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them." 94 Essentially, this creates a Chinese wall protecting the President
from CIA wrongdoing. This broad protection is one of the arguments
supporting CIA control of paramilitary operations. Another argument
for the CIA is that they operate more discreetly than the military.9 5
Further, because the CIA is not a military force, its members are not
classified as combatants under current international law. Conversely,
the capabilities required for paramilitary operations are military,
supporting military control. Additionally, "the task has not been a
continuous priority of the CIA[,] and it makes no sense for the nation to
build parallel capacities." 96
Michael Scheuer, the ex-head of CIA's Osama bin Laden unit, notes
that "America since the fall of the Berlin Wall has been eager to find
proxies to do our dirty work."9 7 In today's drone wars that proxy is the
CIA itself, for the Agency provides a level of operational secrecy that
the military does not, and an air of plausible deniability for American
officials.
Under the Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974, CIA covert operations require
a presidential finding that a particular operation is necessary to U.S.
national security. 98 After the Iran-Contra Affair, Congress sought to
impose new restrictions on the CIA's covert actions in the 1991
Intelligence Authorization Act (the "1991 Act"). 99 Presidential findings
must be sent "to the relevant [congressional] committees as soon as
possible after they are signed and, in any event, before the operation
begins . . . ."1oo In contrast, military Special Operations Forces may be

authorized to conduct drone attacks by simple chain-of-command
authorit from the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces.' As Gregory F. Treverton of the Rand Corporation notes:
The 1991 Act created what turned out to be a loophole by
exempting from the definition of covert action "traditional
military activities or routine support to such activities." The Act
did not define what traditional meant; however, the committee
report indicated that it meant what is usually called "preparing
the battle space" - that is, actions before and related to
anticipated hostilities involving U.S. troops or when hostilities
94. Id. at 210.
95.

GREGORY F. TREVERTON, THE NEXT STEPS INRESHAPING INTELLIGENCE 14 (2005).

96. Id. at 13-14.
97. Nick Baumann, Locked Up Abroad -for the FBI, MOTHER JONES (July 29, 2011),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/proxy-detention-gulet-mohamed.
98. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974).
99.

100.
101.

TREVERTON, supra note 91, at 230.

Id.
Id.
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are underway, whether or not the actions are public. Anticipate[d]
[hostilities were] interpreted in the [Committee] report to mean
that operational planning had already been approved.1 02
Treverton goes on to argue that there exists little difference between
CIA and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) covert
operations:
If findings in the war against terrorism have become so broad as
to cover almost any CIA operation - including those direct
Predator attacks on suspected terrorists - whether the CIA or
the military conducts them seems to matter little. If this is true,
however, the problem lies with the breadth of the findings - if
they are so broad as to cover almost anything, then the finding
process has become a sham.' 03
Treverton's dismissal of any distinction between CIA or USSOCOM
covert operations overlooks international laws precluding non-military
actors from conducting military operations. If the United States wishes
to adhere to its promise of complying with the laws of armed conflict
and international law, then it needs to clarify the CIA's role in
conducting drone operations. It does matter who performs targeted
killings.
The CIA's Special Operations Group (SOG) is the department
within the Special Operations Directorate (SOD) responsible for
carryin out covert paramilitary special operations, including targeted
killing. 4 SOGs paramilitary functionality calls into question its
permissibility under international laws, including the laws of war.105
During the Vietnam War, the CIA participated in a joint covert
program, named "The Phoenix Program," which sought out key
Vietcong targets for strategic assassinations.106 Some parallels exist
102. Id.
103. Id. at 231. Since 1987, USSOCOM has been a four-star functional combatant
command authorized by Congress "to prepare Special Operations Forces to carry out assigned
missions and, if directed by the president or secretary of defense, to plan for and conduct special
operations." See, e.g., About USSOCOM, USSOCOM Website, undated, http://www.socom.
mil/Pages/AboutUSSOCOM.aspx.
104. E.g., Douglas Waller, The CIA's Secret Army, TIME, Feb. 3, 2003, available at
(discussing the CIA
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004145-1,00.html
Special Operations Group).
105. See James Kitfield, Wanted: Dead, NAT'L J., Jan. 9, 2010, availableat http://www.
see also Alex
aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dos/drone-dos_20110720DOSDRONE000018.pdf;
Roslin, When the State Turns Assassin, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 2001, available at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/011020-attack01.htm
terrorist assassinations).
106.

(reviewing the legality of

See generally Phoenix 1967-1971, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecur
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between The Phoenix Program and recent targeted killings performed
via drone attacks. As Anthony D'Amato, an international law professor
at Northwestern University in Chicago, points out:
The laws of war don't explicitly forbid assassination, (but) there
is an implicit ban based on the duty to take prisoners. You can
shoot an enemy soldier in combat, but if you are in a position to
arrest him and take him prisoner-that is, without risk (of) your
own bodily injury-you cannot shoot him.' 07
The CIA's drone program offers no opportunity to capture enemy
targets. Arguably, the detainment of "dangerous" enemy targets poses
its own questions, but a discussion of those implications is not germane
to this article. Professor D'Amato goes on to note "assassination of
individuals in peacetime is a crime against humanity. Assassination of
individuals in war is a war crime." 0 8 Yet the U.S. refusal to recognize
the applicability of certain international laws to the global fight against
terrorism may lessen the likelihood that U.S. officials would indeed be
held responsible for alleged war crimes. 1 09
Evaluating CIA performance of targeted killing, either via drone or
special operations, utilizing principle-agent theory elucidates several
important issues in the legal framework. Principle-agent theory dictates
that principals must avoid moral hazard when hiring agents to perform
services on their behalf."l0 As Ethan Corbin of the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University notes, "[i]f and when a state
decides to ally itself with . .. sub-state actor[s] as an integral component

of its national security policy, clear dilemmas arise.""' Principle-agent
theory centers on having the interests of the agent align with those of
the principal. The central issue in this relationship relies on the fact of
asymmetric information sharing between the parties: that is between the
ity.org/intell/ops/vietnam-phoenix.htm (explaining the Phoenix Program).
107. Roslin, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Ethan Corbin, Principalsand Agents: Syria and the Dilemma of Its Armed Group
Allies, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 25, 27,44 (2011).
Moral hazard is when a party insulated from risk behaves differently than it
would if it were fully exposed to risk. The definition of moral hazard in terms
of armed group agents therefore encompasses not only the concept of
suboptimal outcomes (or shirking behavior) but, in this instance, the brazen use
of force that would expose the principal to greater risk than the agent.
Id. at 44 n.8.
I11. Id. at 28.
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President, NSC, and CIA. The CIA often possesses more accurate or
more complete information than the President, who is charged with
issuing a presidential directive to carry out a targeted killing mission.
There exists a potential for CIA to manipulate information and the
President to make poor decisions regarding the use of force in a targeted
killing operation. Moreover, another complex relationship exists
between the United States and the International Community (IC). The
United States seeks to act in accordance with policies serving the best
interests of its citizens and those policies may not align fully with the
objectives of the IC. Moreover, another complex relationship exists
between CIA and Congress, the ultimate oversight authority. As
esteemed political scientist James Q. Wilson notes:
Congress controls the major day-to-day activities of an agency.
Congress is the "principal," the agency is its "agent" . . . If this is

true it must mean that there are no other significant sources of
influence. Second, Congress has the ability and inclination to
intervene when it learns that an agency is sinning by omission or
commission. But an agency would not sin if it were wholly the
agent of Congress; thus this meaning of control presupposes that
other forces - the [P]resident, the courts, interest groups, or the
have influence on the agency
bureaucrats themselves independent of Congress. Third, Congress creates and maintains
the structural conditions within which an agency operates.112
Because Congress possesses powers of "authorization, appropriation,
investigation, and confirmation" they exert considerable authority over
the CIA.11 3 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reviews
Presidential Findings for targeted killing missions, approves financing
of classified projects, and helps to steer general policy regardinh covert
It is
actions such as the targeted killing programs of the CIA.
important to recognize the effect of outside influence on the CIA policy
regarding targeted killing, in order to get a better idea of how to regulate
its authority so that the country can ensure its compliance with
International Law and moral standards.
CIA targeted killings via drone attacks have
raised important legal questions about the role of targeted killing
in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Administration
112. JAMES Q. WILsoN, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY
THEY Do IT 236 (1989).
113. See generally Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong., Rules of Procedure 112-14
(Comm. Print 2011).

114.

Id.
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officials contend that such killings are legal under established
principles of self-defense, international laws of armed conflict
and the Authorization for Use of Military Force - the so-called
"law of 9/11" passed by Congress following the 2011 terrorist
attacks. "

Harold Koh, State Department legal advisor, defends the Obama
administration's use of CIA drone attacks for the basis of national selfdefense.' 1 6 During his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, President Obama
established U.S. commitment to abiding by international protocols of
armed conflict stating:
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest
in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct . . . [E]ven as we
confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules . . . the

United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the
conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom
we fight. That is a source of our strength." 7
Critics contend that CIA targeted killings have not been carried out
in this spirit. As the ancient Romans knew, it is a miserable state of
things where the law is vague and uncertain.118 Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame argues that members
of the CIA are not lawful combatants and their participation in killingeven in an armed conflict-is a crime. 119 By way of comparison and
contrast, Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law at American University,
thinks that if O'Connell's argument stands ground, then somewhere
there is a perpetrator, and that justice must be served:
[I]f you declare that CIA participation is a crime, then it follows
somewhere there is a perpetrator. . . . Crime is a charge of more

than mere non-compliance [with international law]. If there is a
crime, someone must be responsible for doing it, whether you
115. Thomas J. Billitteri, Drone Warfare, 20 CQ RESEARCHER 653, 656 (2010).
116. Harold H. Koh, U.S. Department of State's Legal Advisor's Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of InternationalLaw, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 25, 2010),
availableathttp://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
117. Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace
Prize, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 10, 2009 1:44 PM), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.
118. From the Latin: Res est misera ubi jus est vagum et incertum. JOHN BOUVIER &
FRANCIS RAWLE, 2 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2161 (1914).

119. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, UNLAWFUL KILLING WITH COMBAT DRONES: A CASE
STUDY OF PAKISTAN, 2004-2009, at 7 (2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstractid=1501144.
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call it murder, criminal extrajudicial execution, what have you
. . . . [The CIA is] acting under perhaps the clearest, deliberately
and (admirably, in my view) least deniable set of orders from the
President of the United States in a long time on contentious
national security matters. If there is a crime, there must
somewhere be a criminal or else it is merely a series of
unfortunate events; if there is a criminal, he or she did not act
alone, because these agents acted under instructions from a
principal. 2 0
Professor Anderson also notes that many people are reluctant to go
after American leaders who sanction targeted killings, because it is not
"politically feasible."' 2 1 Nevertheless, the apparent lack of political will
to examine the legitimacy of targeted killing performed by the CIA
should not deter academic inquiry into whether such actions constitute
criminal misconduct under domestic or international law.
The DoD carefully scrutinizes the legality of carrying out attacks in
mission analysis and the targeting process. On November 3, 2002, the
CIA was charged with conducting a drone targeted killing operation in
Yemen, because the U.S. Air Force was concerned about legal issues. 122
Philip Alston, former Special Rapporteur for the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights concluded that this strike constituted a clear case of
extrajudicial killing.' 23 Jane Mayer's article entitled The Predator War,
published in the New Yorker, outlines the U.S. government's two
different drone programs:
The military's version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates
in the recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets
enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such, it is an extension
of conventional warfare. The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror
suspects around the world, including in countries where U.S.
troops are not based. The program is classified as covert, and the
intelligence agency declines to provide any information to the
public about where it operates, how it selects targets, who is in
charge, or how many people have been killed. 2 4
120. Kenneth Anderson, The Mary Ellen and Benjamin Wittes Debateon Targeted Killing
and Drone Warfare, Opinio Juris (Oct. 26, 2010), availableat http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/26/
the-mary-ellen-oconnell-and-benjamin-wittes-debate-on-targeted-killing-and-drone-warfare/.
121. Id.
122. O'CONNELL,supra note 119, at 3.
123. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Use of
Force During Armed Conflict, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/003/3,
37-39 (Dec. 22,
2004).
124. Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the C.I.A.'s Covert Drone
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Professor O'Connell disagrees with this characterization, because, in
actuality, all attacks, even those performed by the military, are
conducted with CIA input.
As Professor O'Connell highlights, there is an existing legal
framework to govern drone warfare. There is a state's right to selfdefense or, with the authorization of the U.N. Security Council, a state
can engage in armed conflict.' 25 Outside these guidelines, "[s]tates are
restricted from using military force . . . . They may resort to law

enforcement measures in some cases. International humanitarian law
further restricts the use of militar force; all uses of force are also
subject to human rights principles. 6 The basic principles applicable to
evaluating when a state may go to war are collectively enumerated in
the jus ad bellum requirements and the jus in bello principles governing
the conduct in war situations. Professor O'Connell states that "[t]he
right to resort to [drone attacks] must be found in the jus ad bellum; the
way the are used must be based on the jus in bello and human
Accordingly, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which
rights."'
prohibits the use of force, and Article 51, which allows states to respond
in self-defense in certain situations, is relevant to our discussion of the
permissibility of CIA engagement in targeted killings.128 Yet, as
Professor O'Connell duly notes, a problem arises in examining drone
war killings through the lens of these Articles in that "[t]he Charter does
not directly regulate the resort to force within states between
government forces and non-state actors or between non-state actor
militant groups." 29 One can also analyze this problem under a law
enforcement model, but as several scholars point out, there exist gaps in
that theory of reasoning when its applied to targeted killings, especially
by the CIA.' 30
Jus in bello is a particularly helpful theoretical framework when
trying to assess the legitimacy of CIA conducted targeted killings.
According to Knut Dormann, legal advisor to the International
Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, persons with a right to take
direct part in hostilities are lawful combatants; those without a right to
Program?,NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2009/10/26/091026fa fact mayer.
125. O'CONNELL, supra note 119, at 11.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 13.
128. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
129. O'CONNELL, supra note 119, at 16.
130. See generally Michael L. Gross, Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law
Enforcement, Execution, or Self-Defense?, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 323 (2006) (discussing law
enforcement model applicability to targeted killing context); Claire Finkelstein, TargetedKilling
as Preemptive Action, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL

WORLD 156-82 (Claire Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol25/iss2/1

24

Govern and Schlager: "Guns for Hire, Death on Demand": The Permissibility of U.S. Outs

2013]

"GUNS FOR HIRE, DEATH ON DEMAND": THE PERMSSIBILITY OF US. OUTSOURCING

171

do so are unlawful combatants.' 31 If a person has a right to participate in
hostilities, this means that the person may not be charged with a crime
for using force.132 According to Colonel Peter M. Cullen of the U.S.
Army, CIA operatives have no right to participate in hostilities and are
unlawful combatants; accordingly, they may be charged with a crime.133
A discussion of the proportionality and distinction requirements of jus
in bello follows later.
Negative historical connotations of mercenary use have resulted in a
push for criminalizing mercenarism.13 4 Resulting international
provisions, however, fail to adequately define mercenaries and remain
ineffective in establishing a regulatory scheme that could be plausibly
applied to mercenaries, let alone modem PMFs.135 Without extensively
discussing whether and how international law becomes binding, it is
generally accepted that the sources of international law are: (1) treaties,
(2) customary international law, (3) jus cogens principles ("preemptory
norms") recognized by civilized nations, and (4) judicial decisions of
the International Court of Justice.136 Only treaties and custom are
discussed in detail for purposes of this Article.
Treaties are definitive sources of international law.' 3 7 Binding
treaties are those between states that are memorialized in writing, intend
to convey legal obligations or create reliance, and are subject to
governance under international law.138 While treaties are generally
regarded as binding upon only those states party to them, a treaty can
nevertheless bind non-party states insofar as it is declaratory of
customary international law.1 39 Some commentators differentiate
treaties codifying customary international law from those promulgating
131.

See Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/unprivileged Combatants," 85

INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45, 45-46 (2003) ("[U]nlawful/unprivileged combatant/belligerent is

understood as describing all persons taking a direct part in hostilities without being entitled to
do so and who therefore cannot be classified as prisoners of war on falling into the power of the
enemy.").
132. Id. at 45.
133. Peter M. Cullen, The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign Against Terror 9
(2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
&AD=ADA471529; see O'CONNELL, supra note 119, at 22 n.102.
134. See generally Sundby, supra note 71 (discussing the CIA's use of an outside
company to arm drones patrolling Afghanistan).
135. R. ERNEST DuPuY & TREVOR N. DupuY, THE COLLINS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY
HISTORY FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT 335 (2d ed. 1989).

136. Statute of the International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art. 38, availableat
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0.
137. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 26 (2d ed. 2006).
138. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
139.

THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPiHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW [N A

NUTSHELL 118-19 (3d ed. 2002).
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innovations. 140 While near unanimity can be indicative of customary
international law, a high number of accessions alone is not dispositive
when state practice is contrary to a treaty, but even treaties with few
accessions serve more than a rhetorical purpose-they often signal the
opening stages of a drive toward creating customary international

law. 14 1
The Hague Conventions represent the first attempt to codify
customary international law on the use of mercenaries.14 Specifically,
the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land (also known as Hague V) sought to
clarify the rights and duties of neutral states toward belligerent states
during war by regulating mercenary recruitment. Its drafters
distinguished between active recruitment of mercenaries by a state
within its own territory and "the acts of individual citizens leaving to
join a [mercenary] force of their own accord." 143 Hague V, Article 4
precludes a neutral state from opening recruitment centers within its
borders and raising armies for the benefit of a party to an armed
conflict.144 On the other hand, Article 6 expressly communicates that a
state is not required to prevent its citizens nor foreign nationals from
crossing its frontier to join the ranks of a belligerent's army.145 While a
neutral state is required to refrain from domestic recruitment or staging
of mercenaries, Hague V does not outlaw mercenarism and does not
apply to PMFs because they are private corporations.14 6
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (Geneva III) is applicable whenever parties conduct themselves as
belligerents-a declaration of war is not necessary.147 Geneva III
establishes, inter alia, the protections due to prisoners of war (POW),
140.

BEDERMAN, supra note 137, at 27.

141. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understandingand Respect for the Rule ofLaw in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 175, 183 (2005); see also Beatrice Onica Jarka, 30 Years from the Adoption of
Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, 15 LEx SCIENTIA INT'L J. 23 (2008),
available at http://lexetscientia.univnt.ro/ufiles/3.%20Romania.pdf (providing an example of
customary international law changing when Protocol I inserted innovations to try to change
then-existing laws of war on mercenarism).
142. H.C. Burmester, The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 37, 41-42 (1978).
143. Id. at 41.
144. Hague Convention V on Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land, art. 4, Oct. 18, 1907, 9 I.L.M. 99, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter Hague V].
145. Id. art. 6.
146. See, e.g., Zoe Salzman, Private Military Contractorsand the Taint of a Mercenary
Reputation, 40 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & PoL. 853, 856 (2008).
147. Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
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setting out six qualifying classes in Article 4A.148 However, nowhere in
Geneva III are mercenaries mentioned and the term "direct
participation . . . is highly ambiguous."1d9 Also, mercenaries were

regularly incorporated into the military during the period immediately
preceding the enactment of the Geneva Conventions. so
As the Geneva Conventions were being drafted, the Charter of the
United Nations (U.N. Charter) was enacted, establishing a collective
method of addressing threats to international peace and security.' 5 ' This
included the requirement that Member States "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the [p]urposes of the United Nations." 52
Several "non-binding" U.N. resolutions15 3 issued between the Charter's
entry into force and the adoption of the U.N. Convention Against
Mercenaries purportedly place additional restrictions on state authority
to use force, including the use of mercenaries; 15 4 whether the PMF
"distinction with a difference" would exempt PMF activities from this
Convention's application has yet to be litigated. 5 1
In 1965, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted
Resolution 2131, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention
in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their
Independence and Sovereignty.156 Resolution 2131 bars direct and
indirect intervention by one state into the internal or external affairs of
another state.15 7 States were admonished not to "organize, assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of. . . another state or

148. Id. art. 4A.
149. Michael N. Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw and Direct Participationin Hostilities by
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 531 (2005) (referring to
article 4(A)(4) & (5) of Geneva III).
150. Before the United States formally entered World War 11, U.S. citizen-mercenaries
were incorporated into the war effort. The "Flying Tigers" was a group of American fighter
pilots operating under the CAMCO Corporation who "shot down Japanese planes and targeted
infrastructure for three times what regular aviators made, plus a bonus for every downed plane."
PELTON, supra note 50, at 3.

151. Geneva III, supra note 147, art. 2(1).
152. Id. art. 2(4).
153. See BEDERMAN, supra note 137 (non-binding resolutions and treaties with few
signatories may signal the opening salvo in an attempt to bring a new rule into general practice,
later creating a binding customary international law).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 11
(1965) [hereinafter Res. 2131].
157. Id. 11.
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interfere in civil strife of any other state."'" 8 Though enjoying broad
support, Resolution 2131 is unlikely to stand for the proposition that
mercenarism is a prohibited activity. Beyond its failure to specifically
mention mercenaries, "no subsequent UN declaration and few scholars
have cited the resolution as authority for this proposition."' 5 9 Rather,
Resolution 2131 restricts state behavior toward other states without
regard to who the state intended to use for the interference and may well
be inapplicable to PMFs because they are not state actors.' 60
Resolution 2465, the Declaration on Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, was adopted by the General
Assembly.161 Regarding mercenarism, the resolution attempted to make
the use of mercenaries "against movements for national liberation and
independence" a criminal act, brand mercenaries as "outlaws," and
compel Member States to enact domestic legislation to punish "the
recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in their territory." 62
Having garnered a majority by only two votes, Resolution 2465 cannot
be said to represent a widely accepted international principle.163 Even in
the most generous reading, Resolution 2465 limits itself by applying
only to mercenary activity aimed at suppressing "movements for
national liberation and independence." 64
The General Assembly issued Resolution 2625, the Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, in 1970. 165 With Resolution 2625, the pendulum swung
158. Id. 112 (emphasis added).
159. Frangoise Hampson, Mercenaries: Diagnosis Before Prescription, 3 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1991).
General Assembly resolutions, [while] not binding as such in [the area of resort
to armed force], may nevertheless represent an encapsulation of customary
international law. This is particularly likely to be the case where they are
adopted by large majorities, especially if the majority includes the Security
Council veto powers.
Id.
160. See, e.g., WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION 94 (1979).

INTERNATIONAL

LAW: A CONCISE

161. G.A. Res. 2465, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218, at 4 (Dec.
20, 1968) [hereinafter Res. 2465].
162. Id. 8.
163.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

103

(1987) (resolutions evidence customary international law only when adopted by large
majorities).
164. Res. 2465, supra note 161, 1 8.
165. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 121,
123 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Res. 2625].
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against state-sponsored
organization
or encouragement
of
mercenarism. 166 Toleration by the state, however, was not proscribed by
the terms of this resolution, as Resolution 2625 is aimed squarely at the
client state that consumes mercenary services and only prohibits state
organization and incitement of mercenarism. 167 Consistent with the
principles of neutrality embodied in Hague V, Resolution 2625 "stands
out because of its consistency with international law and its lack of
political overtones, two characteristics that may explain the resolution's
unanimous approval and its explicit incorporation into customary
international law by a subsequent decision of the International Court of
Justice." 6 8 Resolution 2625 does not purport to prevent private
corporations from recruiting, training, and conveying individuals for
intervention in the territories of a sovereign state.169
With Resolution 3103, the Declaration on Basic Principles of the
Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien
Domination and Racist Regimes, the General Assembly again took up
mercenarism in the context of post-colonialism. 170 Returning to the
political rhetoric of earlier resolutions, it reads: "The use of mercenaries
by colonial and racist regimes against the national liberation movements
struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of
colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and
the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals."171
Resolution 3103 addresses the status of being a mercenary inasmuch as
they "should be punished as criminals," as compared to describing
mercenaries as "outlaws." 72 At least one learned authority termed
Resolution 3103 a "novel and unsupported declaration" that in no way
criminalizes state use of mercenaries.
Resolution 3314, the Draft Definition of Aggression, describes
"aggression" as the "use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United

166. Govern, supra note 19, at 76.
167. Id.
168. Milliard, supra note 34, at 27 (referring to the case of Nicaraguav. United States,
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)).
169. Govern, supra note 19, at 76.
170. G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030, at 142
(1973) [hereinafter Res. 3103].
171. Id. art. 5.
172. Cf Res. 3103, supra note 170, T 5; Res. 2465, supra note 161, 8.
173. Frits Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The First Session of the Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 19741977, 5 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 24 (1978) (concluding Res. 3103 was neither an accurate nor
authoritative statement on the law).
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Nations." 174 The unjust use of force can occur via a state's armed forces
or by utilizing "mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another [s]tate" or substantially aid a state in the aggression.175 With its
adoption by consensus in 1974, it is apparent that Member States
accepted it as customary international law. 176 By its terms, then,
Resolution 3314 identifies all state use of mercenaries to affect "[unjust]
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
another State" as an act of aggression, in violation of Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter. 177 The affected parties of this resolution are not
mercenaries or PMFs, but rather it is the state that commits an injustice;
unfortunately the status of individual warriors was never addressed in
the Resolution. 7 8

IV. THE DEBATE

OVER THE WAY AHEAD UNDER
LAW AND CUSTOMARY
PHILOSOPHICAL BASES FOR CIVILIAN USE OF FORCE IN
TARGETED KILLING

Just as there is disagreement as to the status of civilian warriors
under international law, is also constant disagreement over when and
how civilians may use the new and advanced technologies like drones
on the battlefield. 79 As P.W. Singer lays out in Wired For War, "When
UAVs are piloted by rank-and-file soldiers [and CIA agents] who have
powers once reserved for generals .

.

. it cannot help but create some

changes in military professional identity and culture . . .,180 We live in
an age of blurred boundaries between intelligence outfits and military
units. Accordingly, we face the pressing question of whether or not
drone operators who work for CIA comply with international law,
especially laws governing combatants. Clarifying the authority for the
CIA to engage in targeted killing could establish the legitimacy of such
attacks and create hope in restoring America's respect in the world by
demonstrating that America will adhere to international protocols and

174.
(Dec. 14,
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 143
1974) [hereinafter Res. 3314].
Id. 3(g).
Milliard, supranote 34, at 30.
Res. 3314, supra note 174, art. 1.
Govern, supra note 19, at 78.
See, e.g., DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA), http://www.

darpa.mil/our work/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2013). DARPA's mission is to "prevent strategic
surprise from negatively impacting U.S. national security and create strategic surprise for U.S.
adversaries by maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military." Id.
180.

P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 362 (2009).
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that it is not a nation of exception.' 8 ' As William C. Banks, Professor of
Law and Professor of Public Administration in the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University notes in
congressional testimony in April 2010:
Contemporary laws have not kept up with changes in the
dynamics of military conflicts. Nowhere is the weakness of the
legal regime more glaring than in its treatment of targeted killing
.

. .

. The relevant spheres of authority overlap-the laws of the

United States (constitutional, statutory, executive, and
customary), international laws (treaty-based and customary), and
international humanitarian law (a subset of international law that
applies during "armed conflicts." The relationship of the spheres
of authority to one another, and their application as binding law is
fraught with dispute and contentiousness.182
Yet, the task faced by the American public of determining the
permissibility of CIA-led targeted killings is nearly impossible because
of the tremendous amount of secrecy and asymmetric information. A
time honored maxim states that, "[n]ot everything that is lawful is
honorable; not everything that is allowable is morally right."' 8 3 Might
does not (necessarily) make right. Of course the United States should
protect its national security interests, but the American public has a
right to judge if government actions are legal, and if not, to "petition
government for [such] grievances" as permitted by the Constitution, that
is, to seek a change in national policy. The propriety and legality of
CIA-led drone attacks comes from analyzing the existing legal
framework of international law, the appropriateness of civilian agency
actions in such missions versus uniformed military forces, and whether
this affects the notion of "military legitimacy" in our pursuit of national
security objectives.
Critics contend CIA drone attacks violate the laws of war because
they (i) are executed by civilian agents and (ii) occur inside another
nation's sovereign territory. Proponents of CIA drone attacks defend the
strikes as lawful acts of war and national self-defense in the fight
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.184 When one surveys the
181.

See, e.g., WILLIAM V. SPANOs, THE EXCEPTIONALIST STATE AND THE STATE OF

EXCEPTION 150-62 (2011).

182. Testimony of William C. Banks, Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform,
Subcomm. on National Security & Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 28,
2010), availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810banks.pdf.
183.

From the Latin: Non omne quod licet honestum est. See, e.g., GABRIEL ADELEYE ET

AL., WORLD DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN EXPRESSIONS: A RESOURCE FOR READERS AND WRITERS

270 (1999).
184.

THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, DRONE WARFARE 141 (2012).
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aforementioned resolutions, a trend toward restricting mercenarism is
apparent and evidences an emerging concept of customary international
law.' 8 5 These restrictions, however, apply to the state organization,
encouragement, or conveyance of mercenaries.186 Despite this
restriction, states are not precluded from tolerating mercenary activities
that lead to a use of armed force in other states, nor are they prohibited
from employment and deployment of contracted forces throughout the
spectrum of operations permissible under international humanitarian
law (IHL). 18 7
The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
builds on Geneva III by proffering a definitive statement on
mercenaries.
Though ratified by 85% of the Member States, Protocol
I's efficacy is limited because the states most active in international
armed conflicts, particularly the United States, are not party to it.1 89 Of
course, provisions of a convention can nevertheless be applicable
against a non-party state when those rules represent customary
international law, but this necessitates consistent state practice.190 While
Protocol I is widely accepted as a codification of customary
international law, the categorization of mercenaries as unlawful
combatants in Article 47 is not.191 The strictures of Article 47 are so
contentious that universal acceptance is unlikely,192 and it risks
becoming virtually irrelevant to armed conflicts involving one or more
non-contracting parties. 9 3
Article 47 undoubtedly condemns mercenary activities and seeks to
remove the protections otherwise afforded to them.' 94 This is a
significant departure from customary international law, which
traditionally gives "mercenaries the same status as the members of the
185. Govern, supra note 19, at 78.
186. Milliard, supra note 34, at 30-31.
187. See, e.g., Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists,20 EUR. J. INT'L L.
359 (2009), availableat http://ejil.oxfordjoumals.org/content/20/2.toc.
188. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1977) art. 47 [hereinafter
Protocol 1].
189. Henckaerts, supra note 141, at 177.
190. McCormack, supra note 23, at 93-94. The International Court of Justice takes great
stock in the near-universal ratification of instruments like the U.N. Charter. Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States, 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27), 99-100, § 188. But see Henckaerts, supra note 141, at 183 (wide popularity
is not in and of itself dispositive)).
191. Henckaerts, supra note 141, at 187; Jarka, supra note 141, at 1-2, 4-5.
192. Yoram Dinstein, Comments on ProtocolI, 37 (Special Issue) INT'L REV. RED CROSS
515 (1997).
193. Protocol I, supranote 188, art. 47.
194. Id. art. 47(1).
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belligerent force for which they [are] fighting.', 1 95 However, what
Article 47 did not do is criminalize mercenarism.1 96 While mercenaries
might now face domestic prosecution, "[t]he mere fact of being a
mercenary is not . . . a criminal act [under Article 47]."l 97 The Soviet

Union's closing statement reinforces this conclusion: "We hope that this
article . .. will provide an incentive to Governments to adopt domestic

legislation prohibiting . . . the use of mercenaries."1 9 8 Proponents of
Article 47 argue that this deprivation represents recent developments in
customary international law.199 Additionally, regional developmentsmost notably within the African Union-are cited as evidence.
The definition in Article 47 of Protocol I is viewed as unworkable
because of its six cumulative elements that must be met in tandem. 2 0 1 if
any one of the six criteria is not met, the definition fails. Perhaps the
most unworkable element of the mercenary definition in Article 47 is
the showing of an individual mercenary's motivation. 202 By necessity a
prosecutor must include a "comparison to the motivations of individuals
who join states' armies, many of whom join because of relatively
attractive compensation and benefit packages." 203 If an individual could
actually be shown to meet all six criteria, he or she would be barred
from claiming prisoner of war protections or combatant immunities2 04
but would nevertheless enjoy the fundamental guarantees of Article 75

195. Burmester, supra note 142, at 55.
196. Milliard, supra note 34, at 41 (citing 6 OR 159 (CDDH/SR.41, May 26, 1977) ("The
aim of the article was to discouragemercenary activity and prevent irresponsible elements from
getting the rights due to a combatant or prisoner of war.") (emphasis added)).
197. Burmester, supra note 142, at 55.
198. Milliard, supra note 34, at 40 (citing 6 OR 204 (CDDH/SR.41, May 26, 1977)
(statement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)).
199. See Protocol I, supra note 188, § IV(C)(6) (discussing the emerging trend discernible
from U.N. General Assembly Resolutions).
200. Milliard, supra note 34, at 36 (referencing the flurry of Conventions and Resolutions
within the African Union on the subject of mercenarism). The following were issued in short
order by the Organization of African Unity: Resolution on the Activities of Mercenaries [1967]
AHG/Res. 49 (IV); International Commission of Inquiry on Mercenaries, Draft Convention on
the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism [1976] (Luanda Convention); Convention for
the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa [1977] OAU Doc. CM/817 (XXIX), Annex II (3d
rev.).
201. Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies and Their Status UnderInternational
HumanitarianLaw, 88 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 573, 578, 586 (2006).

202. Protocol I, supra note 188. The subjectivity of Article 47(2)(c) will be extremely
difficult to prove. Burmester, supra note 142, at 79 n.38 (citing Report of the Committee of
Privy Counselors Appointed to Inquire into the Recruitment of Mercenaries, T 7 (1976)).
203.

ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE NEW MERCENARIES 6 (1985); cf PELTON, supra note 50, at

3 (Colonial American forces also resorted to mercenaries); see also Cameron, supra note 201, at
580 ("many soldiers enlist for strictly, or at least primarily, for financial motives").
204. Cameron, supra note 201, at 579.
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of Protocol 1.205 Modem PMF contractors, however, do not meet all six
elements of the definition of a mercenary under Protocol I and cannot,
therefore, be summarily stripped by Article 47 of combatant immunities
and prisoner of war protections. 20 6
The notion of PMFs engaging in targeted killing is a serious
problem, because ordinarily the role of PMF contractors is far from
being recruited to fight in an armed conflict. 207 PMF contractors
predominately engage in the protection of diplomats, which by its very
nature seeks to avoid hostilities.2 0 8 If the use of force by PMFs is to flee
from an ambush then that effort can hardly be described as direct
participation in the war effort. 209 Admittedly, Protocol I considers any
military hostilities, whether offensive or defensive, to be "participating
in hostilities." 2 10 However, direct participation does not include
everything that is merely helpful to one side over the other. 2 1 1 The
concept of "direct participation" is a murky one, and its scope remains
an open question, subject to caveats with regards to self-defense and
defense of third parties in any event. 2 12 Finally, most contractors with
PMFs are nationals of a party to a conflict, at least in the instances of
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 13 but absent the nationals of a party status,
Article 47 of Protocol I requires its six cumulative elements be met in
tandem for PMFs to be considered mercenaries.2 14
The United Nations took up the question of mercenarism again in
1980 in response to dissatisfaction among Member States with Protocol
I's shortcomings,2 1 5 and so215continued the challenges 216 in the creation of
a comprehensive instrument for the "eradication of these nefarious
activities. . . ."217 Fast-forward 22 years to the U.K. Foreign and
Commonwealth Office conclusion that Article 47's mercenary

205. Id. (citing Protocol I, supra note 188, art. 45 (extending protections to unlawful
combatants)).
206. Id. (citing Protocol I, supra note 188, art. 47).
207. Govern, supra note 19, at 84.
208.

PHILLIP HOLDER, THE EXECUTIVE PROTECTION PROFESSIONAL'S MANUAL 15, 26-27,

43-48, 59-73 (1997).
209. Govern, supra note 19, at 84.
210. Protocol I, supra note 188, art. 49(1) (defining "attacks" as "violence against an
adversary, whether in offense or in defense").
211. Id.
212. See generallyGovern, supra note 19.
213. McCormack, supra note 23, at 94.
214. Cameron, supranote 201, at 578, 586.
215. Milliard, supra note 34, at 57.
216. Hampson, supra note 159, at 30.
217. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Drafting of an Int'l Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, Rep. of the Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/44/766
(1989).
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definition was completely unworkable.2 ' 8 Regrettably the International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries (known as U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries) not only
failed to overcome those shortcomings but fell into the same
definitional abyss as Article 47.219
The Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of
June 8, 1977 (Protocol II), while remaining silent on mercenaries or
PMFs, may arguably give greater latitude in using PMFs for targeted
killings because it allows for broader definitions of civilians who are
legally subject to attack, even though such killings under IHL must
comply with proportionality. 220 Under Article I of Additional Protocol
II (providing that non-international conflict is satisfied by conflicts
between armed forced of a State and "organized armed groups"), PMFs
(as well as mercenaries) are reasonably considered to be "organized
armed groups" capable of such an attack-as well as leaving them
subject to attack. 2 1 Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions requires that attacks be proportionate to be legal,
so the means and force employed in PMF efforts to conduct targeted
killing must not exceed the threats encountered and opposed.22 2
The U.N. Mercenary Convention provides a primary and secondary
definition of "mercenary." The primary definition incorporates the
largely unworkable elements of Protocol I, Article 47,223 but applies to

218. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for
Regulation [Green Paper, Cm 577, 2002] 20 6.
219. G.A. Res. 44/34 [1989] Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34. The Global Policy Forum
notes that
[a]lthough the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries has been
extremely critical of private security contractors, the UN is increasingly turning
to PMSCs in its missions abroad. Private contractors have not been used in
combat roles, but UN reliance on these firms is growing as its personnel
become increasingly targeted in zones of conflict.
PMSCs and the U.N., Global Policy Forum 2013, http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-astates/private-military-a-security-companies/pmscs-and-the-un.html.
220. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Drafting of an Int'l Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, Rep. of the Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/44/766
(1989).
221. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
See also W. Jason Fishe, Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 726-27 (2007).
222. Id. at 727.
223. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 2163 U.N.T.S. 75, art. I(1) (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against
Mercenaries].
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and the
all armed conflicts, not just international armed conflicts,
phrase "direct participation in hostilities" 225 was removed as a
definitional element and made an enumerated offense. 226
The Convention Against Mercenaries also establishes states'
responsibilities. Article 5 provides that states "shall not recruit, use,
finance or train mercenaries" for any purpose, and specifically, states
shall not do so "for the purpose of opposing the legitimate exercise of
the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination." 227 The
Convention also makes an unmistakable distinction for the first time in
international law: all states shall refrain from using mercenaries.2 2 8
Regrettably, the Convention Against Mercenaries has become, by its
drafting and state practices, a largely irrelevant and ineffectual
document. Enacted in 1989, it did not become effective until 2001.229
As of 2013, the total number of Member States that have ratified or
acceded to the Convention is only 32, with 4 reservations or
declarations.230 Low accession and contrary practice militate against the
Convention being a true codification of customary international law,
and therefore the convention is not binding.
Conventional wisdom holds that mercenaries are not motivated by
political or noble causes. 23 1 Lawmakers who attempt to regulate
mercenaries and PMF activities often default to a moral and
philosophical absolute with regards to the private use of force: they
consider it to be an "evil." 23 This can be linked to the notion of
requisite compensation as "significant private gain," albeit without
providing a benchmark of what sort of gain, versus the use of force by
duly constituted, publicly paid military forces in that nation's
oin of "significant private gain" are proven, the
i notions
defense. 233 Even if
illegality of being a mercenary under the extant convention sanctioning
mercenarism has no enforcement mechanism beyond domestic

224. Id art. XVI(b).
225. Id. art. Ill.
226. Id. art. 1(2).
227. Id. arts. V(1), 5(2).
228. Id. art. V.
229. Press Release, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 56th Sess., 3d mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3650
(2001).
230. International Humanitarian Law - State parties/Signatories, International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, ICRC (Dec. 4, 1989),
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflWebSign?ReadForm&id=530&ps=P.
231. Milliard, supra note 34, at 60 (citing 15 OR 196 (CDDH/III/SR.57, Apr. 29, 1977)
(statement of Mr. Alkaff, Yemen: "Mercenaries [have] always been attracted by the hope of
gain")).
232. Id. at 60.
233. U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 223, art. I(2)(b).
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legislation that each contracting state was to enact. 234 The secondary
definition of the U.N. Mercenary Convention most likely does not apply
to PMF contractors,2323 because PMF contractors are not recruited to
participate in a "concerted act of violence" aimed at overthrowing or
undermining a state.236 It is also nearly impossible to prove that
financial gain is the primary motive, fiscal, moral, or otherwise, for
most contracted uses of force.2 37 Lacking evidence to prove at least two
of the five criteria, PMFs will seldom have a credible case made against
them of violating the Convention by the few nations that have ratified or
acceded to the Convention.
Though only a handful of the U.N. instruments discussed reasonably
reflect customary international law with regards to the use of
mercenaries, all of them in tandem begin to reshape the field in this
area, when considered in light of numerous non-binding resolutions and
conventions that go beyond the traditional law of war. 238 It would be
incorrect to assume that PMF contractors operate outside the law,
notwithstanding their ultimate status in international law, because U.S.
citizens and nationals who fill the ranks of PMFs are almost always
subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the United States for any crimes
they allegedly commit. 9
For that matter, in 2008, an international code of conduct was
established and has been championed by the Swiss government as part
of the Montreux process aimed at regulating PMFs. Specifically, the
resulting Montreux Document was the result of an "international
process launched by the Government of Switzerland and the ICRC [as]
an intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for
international humanitarian law and human rights law whenever private
military and security companies are present in armed conflicts." o It is
not legally binding, but is a "compilation of relevant international legal
234. E.L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern PrivateSecurity Industry and
Its Implications or InternationalHumanitarianLaw Enforcement, 49 HARV. INTL L.J. 221, 23031 (2008).
235. Id. at 233 (citing Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private
Military/Security Companies and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
525, 568-70 (2006) (discussing why most PMFs do not meet the six-point cumulative definition
of "mercenary")).
236. Peters, supra note 24, at 323.
237. Gaston, supra note 234, at 233 (citing Protocol I, supra note 188, art. 47(2); U.N.
Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 223, art. I(a)).
238. Govern, supra note 19, at 88.
239. Id. at 89.
240. The Montreux Document - On Pertinent InternationalLegal Obligations and Good
Practicesfor States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During
Armed Conflict, ICRC (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
publication/p0996.htm.
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obligations and good practices" that resulted from negotiations between
industries, governments, and civil societies in their efforts "to establish
an oversight mechanism to provide the code of conduct with some
limited enforcement capacities." 2 4 '
Taking the Montreux Document a step further, the Swiss
government's multi-stakeholder approach delivered in 2010 an
International Code of Conduct (ICoC) for Private Security Service
Providers.2 4 2 The ICoC does not create new law, but lays down the
minimum standards for Private Security Company (PSC) behavior. 243
Specifically, the ICoC
sets out standards for PSC compliance with International
Humanitarian and Criminal Law, and international human rights
standards for the use of force. It explicitly prohibits killings and
sets a higher standard against torture, forced labor and child
labour for private companies than those adhered to by many of
their state agency clients. 244
From the 19th until the 22nd of February 2013 the drafting
conference of the Charter for the Oversight Mechanism took place in
Montreux. 245 By signing the ICoC, signatory companies publicly
commit to operate in accordance with the Code. Signatory Companies
are expected to seek to become members of the Association, which was
anticipated to be functional by the middle of 2013.246 The launch
conference of the International Code of Conduct Association, which
will give shape to the oversight mechanism, will take place on
September 19th and 20th, 2013 in Geneva. 24 7
241. Mark Taylor, A Global Compact For Mercenaries? - Laws of Rule, GLOBAL POL'Y
FORUM (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/52282-a-global-compact-formercen aries.html?itemid=id#50211. From the same timeframe, security analyst Ray Smith
noted that "[t]he Swiss government is taking steps to regulate private military companies
operating under its jurisdiction. The effort to pass domestic legislation coincides with
Switzerland's recent attempts to facilitate an international code of conduct for private security
companies." Ray Smith, Switzerland Checks Mercenaries - Partially, IPS (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/52284-switzerland-checks-mercenaries-partially.html?Itemi
d=id#5021 1.
242. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), Swiss
Confederation, Nov. 9, 2010, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONALCODE
OFCONDUCT FinalwithoutCompany Names.pdf.
243. Taylor, supra note 241. Private Security Company (PSC) is a term often used
interchangeably with PMF and PMC, mentioned previously. See, e.g., Govern & Bales, supra
note 18, at 55 passim.
244. Taylor, supra note 241.
245. ICoC, supranote 242.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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Where compliance with law and best practices has failed, Cedric
Ryngaert points out that litigants of corporate wrongdoing have, since
the 1990s, "increasingly used the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)
against corporations in relation to their overseas activities . . . [so,
v]ictims of PMC abuses abroad could well Biggyback on this trend, and
file a tort claim with a U.S. federal court."2 Such claims against PMCs
have been successfully litigated without requiring that the violation
have occurred in the United States or that the plaintiff or defendant be a
U.S. citizen-most notably in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. 2 49 As an alternative approach to seeking remedies for alleged
PMC abuses, alleged victims "have also filed common law tort claims
for wrongful death and fraud, as opposed to violations of international
law, in [U.S.] courts," 250 or if the offence could be characterized as a
war crime, U.S. criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals could readily
be established under the 1996 War Crimes Act.2 5'
Personal jurisdiction is had by three different mechanisms: the
Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States
(SMTJ), the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and most
recently the amendment of Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of

248. Cedric Ryngaert, Litigating Abuses Committed by Private Military Companies, 19
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1035 (2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
249. Id. (citing Laura A. Dickinson, Contract as a Tool for Regulating Private Military
Companies, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE
MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007)); Eric Mongelard,
CorporateCivil Liabilityfor Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 88 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 665, 688-89 (2006). For examples of such cases, see also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F.
Supp. 2d 1087 (D.D.C. 2004); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
250. Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801 (E.D.N.C. 2005);
Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610 (SD Tex. 2005); Johnson v. Halliburton, No.
EDCVO5-265 (CD Cal., filed Mar. 29, 2005). Ryngaert notes:
These cases were brought by PMC employees against their employer. It may be
noted, however, that in the Saleh and Ibrahim cases, which related to violations
of third parties' rights, the plaintiffs also filed common law claims (assault and
battery, wrongful death and survival, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligence. Saleh v. Titan Corp., Case 1:05-cv-01165-JR,
(D.D.C., June I1, 2007), at 2. After the court's dismissal of the ATCA-based
claims, only the common law-based claims are still viable as we write. It is
noted that, while ATCA claims can be brought by foreigners against other
foreigners ("universal jurisdiction"), common law claims cannot. Id. at 20
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 "does not confer jurisdiction over suits by a
group consisting of only foreign persons against another foreign person," in the
case of CACI NV, incorporated in the Netherlands).
Ryngaert, supra note 248, at 1036 n.11.
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
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Military Justice (UCMJ). 252 An exercise of jurisdiction under MEJA or
SMTJ rests with the U.S. Attorney General, while an exercise of
jurisdiction under the UCMJ places contractors under court-martial
jurisdiction of military commanders in the field if the Justice
Department opts not to take the case first. 253
The SMTJ creates nine specific circumstances where the United
States can exercise jurisdiction outside of its territorial borders; the two
most germane to PMF contractors are those offenses committed by or
against a U.S. national in a location outside the jurisdiction of any
nation, or within the land, building, or residence used by overseas
diplomatic or military missions of the United States.25 4 The MEJA
builds upon the SMTJ by extending its jurisdiction to crimes committed
by personnel employed by or accompanying the U.S. military outside of
U.S. territory-provided the offense is punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment.255 The provisions of MEJA expressly allow
concurrent court-martial jurisdiction, if applicable. 256 Any custodial
actions must be executed by DoD law enforcement officers. Transfer to
a foreign criminal justice system or removal to the United States is only
by order of a federal judge or an order by the Secretary of Defense
because of military necessity. 2 57
The most recent, relevant change to UCMJ extraterritorial in
personam jurisdiction was the 2007 insertion of four simple words into
Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ: "or a contingency operation.",258 It has
been a long-established principle that the U.S. military could exercise
court-martial jurisdiction over PMF contractors in its employ during
declared wars but never outside of that.2 59 The recent amendment
252. Govern, supra note 19, at 89.
253. Memorandumfrom Secretary ofDefense Robert Gates for Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretaries of Defense, and
Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Subject: UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian
Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving with or Accompanying the
Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations, FEDERATION OF
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/gates-ucmj.pdf

[hereinafter Gates Memo].

254.
255.
256.
257.

18 U.S.C. §§ 7(7), 7(9) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 326 1(a)(1) (2006).
Id. § 3261(c).
Id. §§ 3262-3264.

258. UCMJ art. II(a)(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) ("The following persons are subject to
this chapter . . . [i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field.") (emphasis added). See also Peter W. Singer,
Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and its Applicability to Private Military
Contractors, BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions
/2007/01/12defenseindustry-singer.
259. United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (C.M.A. 1970) (reversing the courtmartial conviction of a civilian contractor because the version of § 802(a)(10) then in effect
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changes all of this and now brings PMF contractors within the reach of
military convening authorities during operations such as those
continuing today in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 260
One international trade lawyer, Susan Kovarovics, has commented
on one recent overseas operation, ultimately concluding that U.S.
citizens participating in training foreign troops will likely be subject to
criminal liability absent U.S. government approval.2 6 1 In this particular
instance, former president of Blackwater (a/k/a Xe, a/k/a Academi),
Erik Prince, built an 800-member battalion of foreign troops nicknamed
"Reflex Responses" (R2) for the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) at the
request of the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheik Mohamed bin Zayed
al-Nahyan. 262 The private force's intended purpose is "to conduct
special operations missions inside and outside the country, defend oil
pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks and put down internal
revolts," 263 which could well include "implied" or "stated" missions to
kill opposition leaders or insurgents.
To bolster the force, R2 allegedly recruited a platoon of South
African mercenaries, including some veterans of Executive Outcomes,
the previously mentioned South African company notorious for staging
coup attempts or suppressing rebellions against African strongmen in
the 1990s. 2 4 The contract purportedly includes a one-paragraph legal
and ethics policy noting that R2 should institute accountability and
disciplinary procedures, with "the overall goal . . . to ensure that the

team members supporting this effort continuously cast the program in a
professional and moral light that will hold up to a level of media
scrutiny. 265 Beyond R2's involvement, other, less credible reportage
alludes to the possibility that other PMF groups may also support and/or
conduct targeted killings, namely "to assassinate Pashtun leaders in
Pakistan and Afghanistan and target tribal compounds for strikes by
U.S. Predator drones." 266
applied only in cases of declared war).
260. See, e.g., Gates Memo, supra note 253 (discussing the amendment to give convening
authorities jurisdiction over U.S. civilians operating in their areas of responsibility).
261. Mark Mazzetti & Emily B. Hager, Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater's
Founder, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middle
east/1 5prince.html?emc=etal.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Eric S. Margolis, Soldiers on Sale . .. Who's In Charge of These Hired
Killers?, INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.informationclearing
house.info/article25043.htm. Margolis claims:
Two obscure Pentagon outfits, the "Cultural Engineering Group" in Florida,
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Kateri Carmola, an expert on the use of PMFs, noted that while it
was common for countries to hire contractors for military purposes,
"there is no real legal precedent for a company like [R2], where the
U.A.E. would be used as a launch pad for a wide range of missions, and
potentially for a wide range of clients."2 6 7 As part of such internal
defense missions, that battalion may well be called upon to conduct
targeted killing of key insurgent or insurrection leaders. It is assumed
that the crown prince of Abu Dhabi will deploy such troops if they are
confronted with pro-democracy uprisings like similarly situated Arab
and African countries experienced in 2011 and 2012.268
The R2 initiative reportedly enjoyed some limited and unofficial
support within the White House, with an unnamed official stating in
2011, "The gulf countries and the U.A.E. in particular, don't have a lot
of military experience. It would make sense if they looked outside their
borders for help."2 6 9 However, the project does not have the unwavering
legal blessing of the United States.2 70 Legal experts and government
officials conclude "some of those involved with the battalion might be
breaking federal laws that prohibit American citizens from training
foreign troops if they did not secure a license from the U.S. State
Department."271 Prince's recent security firm is an Emirati company,
and may not require U.S. State Department authorization; nevertheless,
U.S. citizens contributing to the training of foreign troops will likely be
subject to criminal liability absent U.S. government approval. 272
In a May 2010 special report by Reuters, author Adam Entous stated:
"An analysis of data provided to Reuters by U.S. government sources
shows that the CIA has killed around 12 times more low-level fighters
than mid-to-high-level al Qaeda and Taliban leaders since the drone
strikes intensified in the summer of 2008."273 These figures call into
and "Counter-Narco-terrorism Technology Programme" of Virginia funded
[senior Pentagon official specializing in clandestine operations, Mike Furlong]
with $24.6 million. Furlong hired a bunch of former Special Forces types and
assorted thugs. These rent-a-Rambos's (sic) real mission was to assassinate
Pashtun leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and target tribal compounds for
strikes by US Predator drones.
Id.
267. Emily B. Hager & Mark Mazzetti, United Arab Emirates Confirms Hiring
Blackwater Founder's Firm, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/
16/world/middleeast/16prince.html?_r-1&ref-blackwaterusa.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Hager & Mazzetti, supra note 267.
273. Adam Entous, Special Report: How the White House Learned to Love the Drone,
REUTERS 1-2 (May 2010), http://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial20100518/Drones.
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question the effectiveness of drone strikes to severely disrupt terrorist
network functionality. Moreover, Reuters also learned from current and
former U.S. officials that Pakistan, "though officially opposed to the
[drone] strikes, is providing more behind-the-scenes assistance than in
the past. Beyond the human intelligence that the CIA relies on to
identify targets, Pakistani agents are sometimes present at U.S. bases,
and are increasingly involved in target selection and strike
coordination." 274 The support of CIA targeted killing programs by local
governments such as Pakistan and Yemen may help to mitigate critic
concerns as to the legitimacy of the program. Foreign governments that
support CIA targeted killing missions, whether by providing human
intelligence or strike coordination, in essence, condone the practice of
targeted killing in a de facto manner. This begs the question of vicarious
liability for foreign governments or foreign intelligence services that
assist CIA special operations, if the CIA program is deemed unethical
or in violation of international laws. Some opponents of CIA drone
strikes go so far as to suggest foreign intelligence officials should be
held responsible for conspiracy to violate the international laws of war.
Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst who chaired President Obama's
2009 strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy, said the
Obama administration ran with the drone program because, when it
came to office, "[i]t found itself with a real al Qaeda threat and one tool
to work with . . . I don't think he (Obama) had really any alternatives.

He seized the tool that was in front of him." 2 75 Yet, alternatives do exist
and range from having the military conduct the drone attacks to
capturing terrorists for interrogation purposes. Government officials
should always proceed charily when there is opportunity for public
backlash and a questionably legitimate public policy rationale for
clandestine operations to begin with. Whenever the media mentions
capturing of terrorists, non-enemy combatants, and the like, it connotes
allusions of torture, and other forms of prisoner mistreatment, in no
small part due to the publicly aired atrocities at Abu Ghraib. Until the
government restores public trust and strict accountability standards are
implemented for prisoner holding, Obama and his acolytes
understandably want to avoid subjecting the Administration to
unnecessary scrutiny. Moreover, the more the Administration distances
themselves from the CIA, the military, or others directly participating in
the targeted killings, the more the Administration officials may believe
they will escape scrutiny or responsibility for the consequences of the
Administration's sometimes secret policies. President Obama and the
pdf.
274. Id. at 2.
275. Id. at 3.
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White House apparatus seek to benefit from the secret programs'
plausible deniability. John Rizzo, the CIA's top attorney during the
Bush administration said that he
found it odd that while Bush-era interrogation methods like
water-boarding came under sharp scrutiny . . . all the while of

course, there were lethal operations going on, and think about it,
there was never, as far as I could discern, ever, any debate,
discussion uestioning ... the United States targeting and killing
terrorists.
How the CIA identifies "lawful targets" is also a subject of
controversy. A U.S. counterterrorism official said: "Targets are chosen
with extreme care . .. There's no such thing as a random strike."2 7 7 Yet,
the American Civil Liberties Union, and other human rights groups
question the safeguards put into place by the government and assert that
the CIA has "kill[ed] hundreds of militants whose identities are largely
unknown."278 These groups also express concerns over civilians. A
Pakistani intelligence official dealing with South Waziristan said the
vast majority of the deaths were just foot soldiers. "They hit whoever
they get," another intelligence official in North Waziristan said.27 9 A
former U.S. intelligence official said it was unclear what protocols the
CIA was following for targeting foot soldiers: "If it becomes a more
generalized 'kill anybody' (approach), it degrades the notion we're
going after serious threats to the United States. It's a slippery slope." 280
Toward that end of discerning lawful targets, in President Obama's
most recent national security speech, his pronouncement on targeted
killing was that
[w]e act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent
threat to the American people, and when there are no other
governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. Before
any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians
will be killed or injured-the highest standard we can se281
Journalists have collected information on how the CIA distinguishes
between civilians and their targets: "To determine who is a civilian, the
276. Id. at 9.
277. Id. at 3-4.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Obama Rejects Perpetual War, but Questions Remain About Targeted Killings,
NATION (May 23, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/174522/obama-rejects-perpetualwar-questions-rema in-about-targeted-killings#ixzz2Vwi7Cjky.
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CIA looks at a number of indicators, including gender. As a general
rule, a woman is counted as a noncombatant, former officials said." 282
"A Pakistani intelligence officer in North Waziristan estimated that 20
percent of total deaths were civilians or non-combatants, or one in
five."2 83 Jeffrey Addicott, former senior legal advisor to the U.S. Army
Special Forces, said:
The ratio is getting better but based on my military experience,
there's simply no way [to avoid civilian casualties] . .. For one
bad guy you kill, you'd expect 1.5 civilian deaths . .. because no

matter how good the technology .. . killing from that high above,
there's always the "oops" factor.
In the estimation of the DoD's Joint Chiefs of Staff, "[k]nowing that
there exists the imminent probability of civilian casualties, no matter
how minimal, should cause policy makers to question their tactics."2 8 5
Targeting individual enemy combatants in war is perfectly legal and
moral, where it is legal to individually target the leader or commander
of a uniformed military force, so too it would be legal to target the
leader of a terrorist organization. 286 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was the
WWII Japanese Naval Marshal General who ordered the attack on Pearl
Harbor. After intercepting and decoding Japanese radio transmissions
that revealed that Admiral Yamamoto would be flying to the Solomon
Islands for an inspection tour, the U.S. Air Force dispatched fighter
planes to ambush and shoot down Yamamoto's plane. The CIA did not
exist until after 1947, and despite the existence of the Office of Strategic
Services to collect and analyze strategic information required by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to
other agencies, Yamamoto's targeting was handled by conventional
military forces. 2 87 Johnson notes that SS-Obergruppenfuehrer
(Protection Squadron General) Heydrich, a high-ranking German Nazi
official during World War II, and one of the main architects of the
Holocaust, was not targeted for his role in Holocaust atrocities but for
his oppressive governing of German-occupied portions of

282.

ENTOUS, supra note 273, at 5.

283. Id.
284. Id.
285.

See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT TARGETING CYCLE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE

ESTIMATION

METHODOLOGY

(2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dod/

drone dodACLUDRONESJOINTSTAFFSLIDES_1-47.pdf.
286. Johnson, supra note 2.
287. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html?_r-2&pagewanted=
all&oref-slogin&oref-slogin.
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Czechoslovakia. 288 The targeted killings of Yamamoto and Heydrich
certainly have parallels to Al Qaeda leaders, inasmuch as what is true of
uniformed officers may well apply to leaders of non-state actors during
wartime.28 9
Is it legitimate for the United States to justify its targeted killing
programs on the ground that because terrorists violate the laws of war,
then so can the United States in pursuing terrorists? While Professor
Somin claims that terrorists are harder to distinguish from civilians, and
that governments might abuse this distinction, she feels that a
"categorical ban on the targeted killing of terrorists" is not justified and
"such abuses can be constrained in two other ways." Professor Somin
establishes a theoretical framework for permissibility of targeted
killings on the following two bases:
(1) targeted killings can be used against terrorists in conflicts that
are large-scale enough to qualify as a war; and
(2) even when we have an antiterrorist conflict that qualifies as a
war, the deliberate targeting of innocent people under a pretextual accusation of terrorism can still be prosecuted as a war
crime.2 90
It is worth analyzing Professor Somin's interpretation of what
exactly constitutes a war. Professor Somin concedes that the precise
extent at which an armed conflict can be characterized as a war is
debatable. Professor Somin's analysis remains specious on the account
of this uncertainty in precisely defining the term "war." Essential to
Professor Somin's argument is that she does not distinguish between
enemy combatants who are uniformed members of a military and those
who are not. Professor Somin also notes that former President Clinton's
Solicitor General Walter Dellinger argues that terrorists are enemy
combatants. 29 1 On this basis, the CIA gains some credence for assuming
the role of a military agent.
State Department legal advisor Harold H. Koh asserts that the
conflict between al Qaeda classifies as a war: "The United States is in
an armed conflict with al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated
288. Johnson, supra note 2.
289. Id.
290. Ilya Somin, Admiral Yamamoto and the Justification of Targeted Killing, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2011), http://www.volokh.com/2011/05/13/admiral-yamamoto-and-thejustification-of-targeted-killing/.
291. See CNN: License to Kill; Was Assassinating Bin Laden Legal? (CNN television
broadcast, May 4, 2011), available at http://www.cnn.convideo/#/video/bestoftv/2011/05/04/
exp.arena.osama.killing.legal.cnn.
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forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force
consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international
law."292 Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law at American University
says, "Obama's targeted killing doctrine appears to be little different
from Bush's: Once someone has been deemed a lawful target, the CIA
has no obligation to warn or seek to detain that person before
attacking." 2 93 Lawyers masterfully manipulate language to suit their
purpose. Attorney Koh says that targeted killing cannot be likened to
assassinations: "[T]he use of lawful weapons systems . . . for precision

targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in selfdefense or during an armed294conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not
constitute 'assassination."'
Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame
Law School counters Attorney Koh's self-defense assertion with her
position that claims:
[The United States does not] have the right to bomb people where
there's no armed conflict . . . The United States is not fighting in
self-defense against Pakistan. We do not hold Pakistan
responsible for cross-border incursions into Afghanistan and may
not, lawfully use military force in Pakistan in response to those

incursions.
Others such as Green Beret legal advisor Addicott disagree in that:
The battlefield in the "war on terror" is global and not restricted
to a particular nation. As in World War Two, there are no
national limitations or boundaries. This is war and we are entitled
to kill them anywhere we find them .. . We can kill them when
they're eating, we can kill them when they're sleeping. They are
enemy combatants, and as long as they're not surrendering, we

can kill them. 296
However, Addicott appears to ignore the impossibility of surrender
under a targeted killing program. First, targeted killing missions are
secret and the enemy is not forewarned that they will have a set time
period to surrender or else reap the consequence of death. Without
giving the enemy the chance to surrender, the United States violates a
292. ENToUs, supra note 273, at 5.
293. Id.
294. Id. See also Executive Order 12333 issued by President Ronald Reagan on December
4, 1981 officially banning assassinations. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 90 (1981).
295. Id. at 6.
296.

ENTOUS, supra note 273, at 6.
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principle of warfare. If the tables were turned and a foreign entity
decided to target U.S. commanders or leaders, then rest assured they
would want, and likely demand, the chance to surrender. There appears
to be a double standard in warfare conduct-there is the United Statesand then there is every other nation.
Nations like Pakistan are reluctant to publicly support CIA drone
attacks. Yet, Reuters reports that an American Diplomat was slipped a
note by a Pakistani Parliamentarian on one occasion stating, "The
people in the tribal areas support the drones. They cause very little
collateral damage. But we cannot say so publicly for reasons you
understand." 29 7 U.S. officials appear to go along with Pakistani
reluctance to publicly condone drone attacks, and one former CIA
intelligence official said the "CIA was conducting the drone strikes
instead of the U.S. military because the covert nature of the program
gives Islamabad the 'fig leaf of deniability . .. They can't stand u

to

their own people and say they're in league with the U.S."'29
actuality, the CIA could not successfully complete their targeted killings
without the help of Pakistani intelligence services. The Pakistani
intelligence outfits assist the CIA in that they "tell you who they (the
targets) are and that isn't coming from some white guy running around
the FATA. That's coming from the Pakistanis," said a U.S. official.2 9 9
The lack of transparency of Pakistani intelligence's role in assisting the
CIA in drone operations causes further frustration when trying to build a
complete picture of the situation.
U.S. intelligence officials support the use of drones over any other
method because they deem it to be "the most precise and possibly
CIA
humane targeted killing program in the 'history of warfare."'
lawyers determine if "high-value targets . . . pose a continuing and

imminent threat" to national security. 3 Other precautions seem to be
taken in order to limit casualties. Such measures offer reassurances to
critics of the drone targeted killing program. Specially designed missiles
that have a small blast field with minimal shrapnel are utilized, and
weapons can be maneuvered away from a target if "there's any
possibility whatsoever that a non-combatant may be at risk . . . " said a
U.S. official.3 0 2 A CIA lawyer is always present during the operation in
order to verify the identity of the target. Yet, despite all these practical
measures to limit casualties, the program has one major flaw according
to Addicott, in that when you kill one individual, chances are they have
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
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multiple children and as a result you incite the population toward a
hatred of the United States and thereby exacerbate the very problem you
seek to avoid by the targeted killings in the first place. Under this
analysis, targeted killing becomes a zero-sum game. Critics of targeted
killings point to individuals like Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant
living in Connecticut who attempted to ignite a car bomb in the middle
of Time Square on May 1, 2010.303 During the trial, testimony of
Shahzad suggested that the U.S. facilitated raid of the Red Mosque in
Islamabad on July 10, 2007, fueled his anti-American attitude and
prompted him to attempt the bombing. The CIA and the United States
need to consider whether a program that arguably may increase terrorist
activity is worthwhile. However, more evidence needs to be gathered
before any definitive conclusions can be made that targeted killings
increase terrorist attacks.
Afsheen John Radsan, Professor at William Mitchell College of Law
and assistant general counsel to the CIA from 2002 to 2004 says, "Killer
drones are the future of warfare." 304 Professor Radsan also says that, as
a result of their emergence, "targeted killing-whether by the CIA or
anyone else-is controversial. Proponents contend it is legal to use
armed drones in self-defense or as part of an armed conflict under
international humanitarian law. Critics decry targeted killing as extrajudicial assassination." 30 5 Professor Radsan believes that the
International Human Rights Law covers the CIA drone attacks in parts
of Pakistan and that
operational parts of al Qaeda and the Taliban are civilians
"directly participating in hostilities." Until they renounce
violence, they are functional combatants, subjecting them to
American targeting under the law. [Professor Radsan is]
confident a consensus will emerge that, under some
circumstances, targeted killing of suspected terrorists is legal.3 06
Professor Radsan also addresses the issue of CIA performing drone
operations instead of the operations being exclusively conducted by the
DoD: "While CIA officers are unlikely to wear uniforms and to follow
other military formalities, they take it for granted, whether engaged in
303. Andrea Elliot, Militant's Pathfrom Pakistan to Time Square, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/23terror.html.
304. Afsheen John Radsan, Loftier Standards for the CIA's Remote-Control Killing
(2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1604745. See also Scott Shane,
C.I.A. to Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.ny
times.com/2009/12/04/world/asia/04drones.html?pagewanted=all.
305. Rasdan, supranote 304, at 1-2.
306. Id. at 2.
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intelligence gathering or in covert action, that they will not be treated as
privileged belligerents (POWs) if al Qaeda captures them . . ."307
Professor Radsan argues that certain IHL guidelines must govern CIA
targeted killing, including, but not limited to: (1) distinction, (2) military
necessity, and (3) proportionality. Distinction involves separating
combatants from civilians. Military necessity states, "an attack should
be reasonably expected to create a concrete and direct military
advantage."30 Proportionality requires limiting of collateral damage.
Professor Radsan also identifies a fourth principle, the idea of
"precaution," which "requires all feasible measures to minimize harm to
peaceful civilians and property." 309
In Operation Neptune Spear: Was Killing bin Laden a Legitimate
Military Objective, a co-author of this Article examined the legitimacy
of targeted killings, specifically in the case of Osama bin Laden, in
situations where there exists a "legitimate military target," the decision
makers evaluate all options, and the existing body of law governs the
type of military action. 310 If non-military personnel, such as civilian
members of the intelligence community perform military actions in the
targeted killing raids, are these actions still permissible under the
international law framework or moral reasoning? 311 Because CIA
operatives generally do not wear military garb, and may operate under
Non-Official Cover (NOC) status,3 12 even if they receive approval from
National Command Authority (NCA), 3 13 this method arguably violates
the principle of distinction.31
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kevin H. Govern, Operation Neptune Spear: Was Killing bin Laden a Legitimate

Military Objective?, in TARGETED KILLINGS LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD

317 (Claire Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012).
311. See id. at 350-51 (discussing disagreement between CIA and military leaders on
launching a missile strike at Taliban leader Mullah Omar).
312. When serving under what is referred to as "nonofficial cover" (NOC), CIA officers
assume covert roles in organizations without ties to the government, such as American
businessmen. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, C.I.A. Agents, Blowing Their Own Cover, TIME (Nov.
26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/books/review/Berenson-t.html?pagewanted=all
&_r-0.
313. See Gregory S. McNeal, The U.S. Practice of Collateral Damage Estimation and
Mitigation (Nov. 9, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1819583 (discussing U.S. Military
estimation of collateral damage in targeted killing operations); see Kenneth Anderson, Targeted
Killing, HOOVER (May 11, 2009), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/
article/5281.
314. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 1, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; U.N. General Assembly, Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal
Court (last amended Jan. 2002), July 17, 1998, A/CONF. 183/9; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)b. With regard to "nonstandard" uniforms, see, e.g., W.
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Generally speaking, war must be waged by military outfits and not
by civilian entities. According to a U.N. report on targeted killing
(Report), the CIA's drone fleet is "reportedly flown by civilians,
including both intelligence officers and private contractors (often retired
military personnel)." Moreover, the Report states:
Under IL, civilians, including intelligence agents, are not
prohibited from participating in hostilities. Rather, the
consequence of participation is two-fold. First, because they are
"directly participating in hostilities" by conducting targeted
killings, intelligence personnel may themselves be targeted and
killed. Second, intelligence personnel do not have immunity from
prosecution under domestic law for their conduct . . . Thus, CIA

personnel could be prosecuted for murder under the domestic law
of any country in which they conduct targeted drone killings, and
could also be prosecuted for violations of applicable [U.S.]
law. 316
Under this analytical approach, the CIA cannot partake in targeted
killings without fear of prosecution for murder under the nation's law in
which the attack took place.
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has categorized its fight
against Al Qaeda "as an armed conflict, a framework upheld by all three
branches of the [U.S.] government." 317 This begs the question, if all
three branches of government characterize the fight against Al Qaeda as
an armed conflict warranting military force, do military actions
performed by non-military actors still come within a permissible
mandate? Under IHL, this action does not appear permissible.
In Ex Parte Milligan,3 18 the U.S. Supreme Court found that "the
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances." 319
Hays Parks, Special Forces Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 494 (2003),
availableat http://www.pegc.us/archive/Journals/parks_4_Chi J Intl L_493.pdf.
315. See Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. General Assembly,
Human Rights Council 14 Sess. Agenda item 3, at 7 (May 28, 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.
316. Id. at 22.
317. Laurie Blank, Finding the Paradigm:Investigating Bin Laden's Demise, JURIST (May
8, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/05/laurie-blank-findingthe-paradigm.php, cited in Govern,
supra note 310, at 357.
318. ExParte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866).
319.

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 268-69 (7th ed.

2010).
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Diametrically oposed to that view is Cicero's concept of: "Inter arma
silent leges."32 There exists an intermediate view, as articulated by
Justice William Rehnquist who wrote in 1998, "laws will not be silent
in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice." 321
Citizens must question the limits of executive power concerning the use
of our armed forces and intelligence outfits during exigent
circumstances. Professors Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther
pose three questions essential to solving this puzzle, to which we will
respond:
(1) Is it reasonable to expect the government to behave within the
same constitutional boundaries during periods of crisis as periods
of calm?
(2) Should courts intervene during a national security crisis to
determine whether or not the actions of the executive branch have
violated the Constitution or infringed upon the powers of the
legislative branch?
(3) Should the judiciary wait until the crisis is resolved so as not
to impede the political branches in their efforts to resolve it?3 22
Indeed it is reasonable to expect governments to substantially behave
within the same constitutional boundaries during periods of crisis as
periods of calm, otherwise abrogable constitutions offer little if any
consistency, predictability, or transparency for the peoples holding such
social compacts as the highest law of their land. Having said that,
systems with constitutional courts may offer advisory opinions if so
empowered regarding the limits of executive authority, or consider such
challenges as their jurisdictions allow. Fundamentally, when cases and
controversies are brought for challenge after a crisis is resolved, they
inevitably fail the justiciability element of mootness; thus, a champion
for the challenge must ensure they act while matters are still ripe for
judicial resolution.32 3
Michael N. Schmitt, Professor of Law at the U.S. Naval War
College, argues that "civilian objects may become military objectives
when the enemy employs them for military ends." 324 This view is
320.

"In Times of War Laws are Silent." See, e.g., ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO: THE LIFE

AND TIMES OF ROME's GREATEST POLITICIAN 96-99 (2001).

321.

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 319, at 269.

322.

Id. at 266.

323.

See, e.g., WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER:

CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (2007); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW
WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005).

324. See Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in
Afghanistan in the War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis 311 n.24, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
Delivery.cfm/SSRNID1600272_codel411821.pdfabstractid=1600272&mirid=1.
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particularly convincing when analyzing CIA targeted killing of
terrorists. Yet, as Professor Radsan admits, "The enemy's practice of
hiding among peaceful civilians makes it quite difficult for him to
determine who is a legal target-especially when civilians carry
weapons for protection from thieves, bandits, and insurgents."32 5 Dakota
S. Rudesill, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relation, emphasized the need for precision in the use of warfare
technologies so as to remain compliant with the proportionality
requirements of the International Laws of Armed Conflict.3 26 Since
Roman times, legal theorists have held that "It is always safer to err in
acquitting than in punishing, (and) on the side of mercy than of
justice.
If the CIA can utilize capture missions, instead of targeted
killing missions, it would put the United States in a more honorable
position. Yet, even if the CIA does not move toward more capture
missions, with technological advancements in the accuracy of weapons
technologies used in targeted killing operations, the CIA can ensure that
they remain compliant with the doctrine of proportionality.
Under IHL, attackers must ensure that aggressors take all necessary
steps to ensure accuracy and successful achievement of their intended
objectives. The CIA's use of drones in targeted killings is very different
from normal military operations and thus requires a slightly different
accountability and review standard, although the general underlying
principles dealing with armed conflict apply in both situations. What
must be done to "[reconcile] democracy with secrecy . . . what sort of

accountability best balances these interests?" 328 Professor Radsan notes
that the CIA's drone campaign is unlike traditional armed conflict for
several reasons:
(1) the limited number of strikes allows each situation to be
individually and comprehensively evaluated,
(2) every strike has a lethal consequence and therefore there must
be heightened scrutiny as a result,
(3) the availability of video, audio, cables, and other documents
allows for a "meaningful ex post review," and
(4) the level of secrecy that accompanies CIA targeted killing
325. Radsan, supra note 304, at 3.
326. Dakota S. Rudesill, Precision War and Responsibility: Transformational Military
Technology and the Duty of Care Under the Laws of War, 32 YALE. J. INT'L L. 517, 531-32
nn. 1, 71 (2007) (discussing precision and agency).
327. From the Latin: Tutius semper est errare in acquietandoquam in puniendo, ex parte
misericordiaequam ex partejustitiae.See, e.g., Adams' Notes of Authorities for His Argument
for the Defense, Oct. 1770, 3 Legal Papers of John Adams, http://www.masshist.org/publicati
ons/apde/portia.php?id=LJA03d008.
328. Radsan, supra note 304, at 6.
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operations requires a "countervailing check." 32 9
It is important to recognize the jurisdictional boundaries for CIA
targeted killing, as previously noted. In light of the domestic use of
drones for customs and border enforcement, amongst other roles, will
the CIA drone attacks ever be permitted in the United States? Will CIA
drone attacks ever be permitted in the United States? It is not likely
under present laws or policies.
Professor Radsan's most cogent argument may be that "The
government's power to kill must be carefully controlled-or it could
turn into a tyranny worse than terrorism."330 CIA targeted killing
becomes most controversial when one of our own, an American citizen,
is placed on the target list. In the summer of 2012, Congress considered
two measures that "would compel the Obama administration to show
members of Congress what Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) calls
Obama's 'license to kill' namely, the "internal memos outlining the
legal ustification for killing Americans overseas without charge or
trial." 31 Professor Radsan argues that this objection to killing American
citizens because it violates due process is unfounded because it has two
misplaced premises:
Extraterritorial actions which the American government takes
against non-citizens do not implicate due process.
Due process requires a judicial trial before the United States may

329. Id. at 7.
330. Id. at 8.
331. See To Extend Certain Amendments made by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
and for Other Purposes, S. 3276, 112 Cong., 2d Sess., http://www.motherjones.com/documents/
405322-comyn-targeted-killing-amendment. In Adam Serwer, Congress Wants to see Obama's
License to Kill, MOTHER JONES (July 31, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/
congress-disclose-obama-targeted-killing-memos, Serwer noted that
Comyn's amendment would require the Obama administration to provide the
Office of Legal Counsel memo justifying the killing program to legislators on
several congressional committees. Democrats on the Judiciary Committee
voted to shelve Cornyn's proposal, but that does not mean the effort is dead.
Cornyn could propose his amendment again later this year, and there is also a
section of a separate intelligence bill that would compel the administration to
share all of the Justice Department's legal opinions on intelligence matters with
the congressional intelligence committees-unless the White House invokes
executive privilege.
332.

Radsan, supra note 304, at 9.
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kill one of its own citizens. 333
Professor Radsan supports the first claim by citing his previous
article on the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush, which
subjects the U.S. government to due-process restrictions wherever it
acts in the world.3 3 Support for Professor Radsan's second claim comes
from the idea that:
in a law enforcement context, the trial requirement holds true
except where the target poses an immediate and severe threat. It
does not hold true, however, under IHL. During World War II,
for instance, it was legal for American soldiers-without a
judicial trial-to fire on American citizens who fought for the
Nazis.
Our nation is now developing a due process for targeted killing
by drone. If non-American lives are just as important as
American lives, then one model of due process (or precaution to
use an International Human Rights Law term) should apply
across the board. In negative terms, if the controls are not good
enough for killing Americans, then they are not good enough for
killing Pakistanis, Afghans, or Yemenis. 3 36
If we cannot resolve this very question of due process applicability,
how can we condone CIA targeted killings?
V. CONCLUSION
In NuremburgRevisited and Revised. The Legitimation of Torture in
the United States, Professor Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Chair for Public
Interest Law at The George Washington University Law School laments
that "[t]he greatest triumph for terrorists is not the destruction of a
people but to get a people to destroy their own values." 337 Debate on the
legitimacy of CIA-led targeted killings foists the reality that the United
333. Id.
334. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see also Richard Murphy & Afsheen
John Radsan, Due Processand TargetedKilling of Terrorists,31 CARDozo L. REv. 405 (2009).
335. Radsan, supra note 304, at 10.
336. Id. Regarding the implications of this surrogate warfare methodology in Yemen, see,
e.g., Leila Hudson et al., Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates Through
Counterterrorism?, MIDDLE E. POL'Y COUNCIL (2012), available at http://mepc.org/journal/
middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-yemen-fostering-emirates-through-counterterrorism.
337. DEAN REUTER & JOHN YOO, CONFRONTING TERROR: 9/11 AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 115 (2011).
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States may be acting contrary to what our President has declared and
converse to international legal custom regarding armed conflict. What
we need is a reaffirmation of our commitment to respect the principle of
distinction in warfare, whether conducted by our military or by the CIA
or other paramilitary forces. In protecting our national security,
President Obama and future administrations should be vigorous but not
at the cost of our integrity. Targeted killings have legal basis when
performed by military actors, but the CIA is not part of the military.
Despite past precedent for CIA-led special operations, it is time that our
government reevaluates the use of the CIA for sensitive targeted killing
missions, especially outside the context of a declared war. Presidents
should not use the CIA to skirt legal obligations. The CIA should not be
allowed to shirk and subvert democracy by hiding under the guise of
national security secrecy. And, to the policymakers who support
targeted killing by the CIA: "You knew what was going to happen. You
intended it to happen. You wanted it to happen. You are glad it has
happened; and it serves you right." 338 Indeed, the unthinkable has
happened-critics are challenging government policy-the beauty of
democracy.
Thomas Paine articulately described the importance of adhering to
the rule of law in society: "For as in absolute governments the King is
law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be
.no other." 339 The CIA is challenging this very principle.
In art imitating life, from a relatively contemporary source, the 2006
film entitled The Good Shepherd brings to light the power of this
intelligence juggernaut.340 Richard Hayes, the fictional CIA agent tells
his colleague Edward Wilson that he did not think oversight committees
could "look into [CIA's] closet . . . as if [they'd] let them." 34 1 Hayes
goes on to say that "I remember a senator once asked me, when we talk
about 'CIA,' why we never use the word 'the' in front of it. And I asked
him, "Do you put the word 'the' in front of 'God'?" 342 There is a danger
that Executive Branch operations carried out by the CIA and its
surrogates will come to embody the very essence of a God-if they pass
judgment on who lives and who dies, at times, regardless of
international law and morality.
338.

GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE IRRATIONAL KNoT 332 (1905).

339. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 50 (Mundus Publishing 1942) (1776).
340. THE GOOD SHEPHERD (Universal Pictures 2006). The character Edward Wilson is not
to be confused with the real-life CIA operative Edwin Wilson, but rather the character was a
loose composite based on James Jesus Angleton and Richard M. Bissell. See Rachel Dempsey,
Real Elis Inspired Fictional 'Shepherd,' YALE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.yale
dailynews.com/news/2007/j an/18/real-elis-inspired-fictional-shepherd/.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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If the CIA or its surrogates violate the letter of laws, or customs and
standards of morality, which are the spirit of those laws, will they be
protected from prosecution and/or sanction? Professor Turley highlights
that one defense stood out from the Nuremburg Trials, and it was the
Befehl ist Befehl or Orders are Orders defense. 4 3 Nuremberg Principle
IV states "[t]he fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to
him." 344 Professor Turley argues that Obama revived the Befehl ist
Befehl defense "when he announced a blanket immunity for CIA
officials and his intention to protect CIA officials as vigilantly as they
protect our security . . .
According to Professor Turley, "future
Presidents understand that they need only select a group of willing
lawyers to issue self-serving analysis to shield themselves and their
subordinates from prosecution." 34 6
This and future administrations need to recognize that if abuses in
the form of torture had not taken place at Abu Ghraib and in other CIA
"black-sites," then the President would have other options beside
targeted killing, and probably greater opportunities to legally gather
intelligence to thwart future attacks. As Brian Michael Jenkins of the
Rand Corporation wrote in Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our
Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves: "[t]he terrorist threats we confront
today will continue for many years. We are still closer to the beginning
than the end of what is likely to be a very long campaign . . . The

defense of democracy demands the defense of democracy's ideals." 347
Americans must always remember that "[t]he conflict with Islamic
extremist terrorists is ultimately a war of ideas, and we lose the war if
we stoop to their methods." 48 Violating international protocol by
having CIA-led targeted killings retards American progress in
343.

REUTER AND YOO, supra note 337, at 122.

344.
345.
346.

Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.

347. See BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND CORP., UNCONQUERABLE NATION: KNOWING
OUR ENEMY, STRENGTHENING OURSELVES 176 (2006). Regarding the Obama Administration's
heeding the advice of critics, see, e.g., GREG MILLER, OBAMA'S NEw DRONE POLICY HAS CAUSE
FOR CONCERN (May 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
obamas-new-drone-policy-has-cause-for-concern/2013/05/25/Odaad8be-c480-l1 le2-914f-a7aba6
0512a7_story.html. See also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HOW DOES THE RECENT SHIFT IN
U.S. DRONE POLICY IMPACT "SIGNATURE STRIKES"? (June 11, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/unitedstates/does-recent-shift-us-drone-policy-impact-signature-strikes/p30885.
See also MICAH
ZENKO, ENHANCING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S DRONE STRIKES TRANSPARENCY, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 4, 2013), http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2013/06/04/enhancing-theobama-administrations-drone-strikes-transparency/.

348.

REUTER & YOO, supra note 337, at 240.
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rebuilding our status as an international paradigm of democracy and
excellence.
History does repeat itself, albeit with different actors, in different
locations, in different times. American citizens helpless to counteract
abuse of wartime powers by the President and (at the President's
direction) the CIA. The immense secrecy surrounding the CIA's drone
program makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the American public to
decide whether to support or oppose the programs. 34 9 Increased
transparency about targeting procedures would allow the public to better
judge the appropriateness (and effectiveness) of the programs and
would likely result in greater accountability for the targeted killing
program, absent some form of judicial review.35 0 In turn, these measures
would increase the likelihood of the Administration's policies being
aligned with the norms and requirements of international law.
General George Washington's orders to Benedict Arnold in
September 1775 could and should stand as the threshold standards of
conduct during military operations and the treatment of combatants and
noncombatants alike:
Should any American soldier be so base and infamous as to
injure any Canadian or Indian in his person or property, I do most
earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such severe and exemplary
punishment, as the enormity of the crime may require. Should it
extend to death itself, it shall not be disproportioned to its guilt, at
such a time and in such a cause.351

349. Even though President Obama has tried to shift focus on positive accomplishments of
the CIA, questions still loom over the drone program legality. See, e.g., Shikha Dalmia, Will
Liberals Hold Obama Accountable for Civil Liberties Violations?, WASH. EXAMINER (May 23,
2013), http://washingtonexaminer.com/shikha-dalmia-will-liberals-hold-obama-accountable-forcivil-liberties-violations/article/2530380.
350. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer, Reaction - JudicialReview of Targeted Killings, 126 HARv.
L. REV. F. 185 (2013), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol126_
jaffer.pdf; see Interview by Michael Rass with Amos Guiora, Israeli Legal Expert: Lack of
Judicial Oversight in Targeted Killings a 'Recipe for Disaster,' PRI's THE WORLD (Feb. 5,
2013), http://www.the world.org/2013/02/israel-targeted-killings/.
351. Orders of General George Washington to Colonel Benedict Arnold, Camp at
Cambridge (Sept. 14, 1775), available at http://www.americanrevolution.org/arnold/arnold3.
html. In its entirety, the letter read:
CAMP AT CAMBRIDGE, 14th September, 1775 To COLONEL BENEDICT
ARNOLD. Sir: - You are intrusted (sic) with a command of the utmost
consequence to the interests and liberties of America. Upon your conduct and
courage, and that of the officers and soldiers detached on this expedition, not
only the success of the present enterprise, and your own honor, but the safety
and welfare of the whole continent may depend. I charge you, therefore, and
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Some 127 years later, Senator George Frisbie Hoar said during a
1902 speech arguing against U.S. occupation of the Philippines that
"who ever heard before of an American gentleman, or an American,
who took as a rule for his own conduct the conduct of his antagonist, or
who claimed that . . . 2[we] should act as savages because she had
savages to deal with."3 5 Senator Hoar was trying to make the point that
America needs to respect the morality of conduct when dealing with its
enemies. He goes on to say that "[He] had supposed, Mr. President, that
the question, whether a gentleman shall lie or murder or torture,
depended on his sense of his own character, and not on his opinion of
his victim." 3 53 President Obama, the CIA, and other government leaders
need to embrace Washington's and Hoar's principles and adhere to both
the spirit and the letter of international laws of war, regardless of what
the officers and soldiers under your command, as you value your own safety
and honor, and the favor and esteem of your country, that you consider
yourselves as marching not through the country of an enemy, but of our friends
and brethren, for such the inhabitants of Canada, and the Indian nations, have
approved themselves in this unhappy contest between Great Britain and
America, and that you check, by every motive of duty and fear of punishment,
every attempt to plunder or insult the inhabitants of Canada. Should any
American soldier be so base and infamous as to injure any Canadian or Indian
in his person or property, I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such
severe and exemplary punishment, as the enormity of the crime may require.
Should it extend to death itself, it shall not be disproportioned to its guilt, at
such a time and in such a cause. But, I hope and trust, that the brave men who
have voluntarily engaged in this expedition, will be governed by far different
views, and that order, discipline and regularity of behavior, will be as
conspicuous as their valor. I also give it in charge to you to avoid all disrespect
of the religion of the country, and its ceremonies. Prudence, policy, and a true
Christian spirit, will lead us to look with compassion upon their errors without
insulting them. While we are contending for our own liberty, we should be very
cautious not to violate the rights of conscience in others, ever considering that
God alone is the judge of the hearts of men, and to him only in this case, they
are answerable. Upon the whole, sir, I beg you to inculcate upon the officers
and soldiers the necessity of preserving the strictest order during the march
through Canada; to represent to them the shame, disgrace, and ruin to
themselves and their country, if they should by their conduct turn the hearts of
our brethren in Canada against us; and, on the other hand, the honors and
rewards, which await them, if by their prudence and good behavior they
conciliate the affections of the Canadians and Indians to the great interest of
America, and convert those favorable dispositions they have shown into a
lasting union and affection. Thus wishing you, and the officers and soldiers
under your command, all honor, safety, and success, I remain, Sir, Your most
obedient humble servant, GEORGE WASHINGTON.
Id.
352.

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR,

SUBJUGATION

OF THE PHILIPPINES INIQUITOUS

(1902),

availableat http://www.bartleby.com/268/10/25.html.
353. Id.
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terrorist enemies do. It would be unconscionable, and gravely
disappointing, if the United States would act through the CIA to
conduct targeted killings that violate the very principles of international
conduct to which we claim to adhere.
Our nation deserves enhanced transparency regarding the CIA's
targeted killing programs. As James Madison so eloquently spoke, "A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquirinp it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps
both." 35 The CIA is an invaluable resource in opposing U.S. enemies,
but it needs to heed and adhere to the international laws of war. The
Romans may have believed that "Necessity makes lawful what
otherwise was unlawful," 3 55 but should we in the present era follow that
maxim where there are substantial legal and policy concerns about the
CIA and nonmilitary civilian contractors carrying out drone attacks,
especially when the uniformed military has the same capacities and
clearer political and legal authority to do so? Drone attacks could-and
probably should-move entirely under the purview of the DoD, with the
CIA assisting only in the gathering and confirming of intelligence. 356
With impending defense cuts as called for in the Sequester
Transparency Act signed by President Obama on August 7, 2012, 57 the
transfer of certain targeted killing operations to the CIA should not
become a ploy by our government to avoid facing the realities of
decreased defense spending. The time has come for our government to
address these issues seriously, truthfully, and transparently with the
American people and the world.

354. James Madison, Letter to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/vlchl8s35.html.
355. From the Latin: Quod alias non fuit licitum necessitas licitum facit. See, e.g.,
BOUVIER & RAWLE, supra note 118, at 2146.
356. See Richard A. Best, Jr. & Andrew Feickert, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
CIA ParamilitaryOperations: Issues for Congress, 2006 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2006),
availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf.
357. Sequestration Transparency Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-155, 125 Stat. 552 (2012).
This law gave the president 30 days to report to Congress on the estimated impact of the 2011
Budget Control Act's sequestration threat on discretionary and mandatory spending.
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